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IS BUSING PREFERENTIAL? AN 
INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS OF 
PROPOSITION 209 
SEAN PAGER * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Last November, California voters approved Proposition 209. Its 
approval, however, hardly has ended debate over what was provoca-
tively called the California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI). In the imme-
diate aftermath of the election, attention focused on a challenge to the 
initiative's constitutionality. Within a month, a federal district court had 
issued a preliminary injunction preventing its implementation. 1 The 
Ninth Circuit promptly reversed on interlocutory appea1.2 Further ap-
peals ended when the United States Supreme Court denied a petition 
for certiorari later that year? As a result, CCRI has become law and the 
text of Proposition 209 now comprises section 31 of the California 
Constitution.4 
Now, a new debate has begun as to CCRI's likely meaning. 
Clause (a), the core provision of section 31, prohibits state action that 
* J.D. University of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law (1998). 
Sean Pager is an associate at the Howard Rice Law Firm in San Francisco. 
1. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996), 
(enjoining the implementation of Proposition 209 on federal constitutional and statu-
tory grounds), opinion amended and superceded on denial of rehearing by 122 F.3d 
692 (9th Cir. 1997). 
2. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 698 (9th Cir. 1997). 
3. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997). 
4. In referring to the legislative history of the initiative, this Article will generally 
use its ballot designation, i.e. Proposition 209, or its official title, abbreviated as CCRI. 
When discussing the text of the constitutional provision that resulted, section 31 will be 
used. In other contexts, the terms may be used interchangeably. 
3 
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"discriminate[s] against, or grant[s] preferential treatment to any indi-
vidual" in specified domains.5 Given this broad, highly abstract lan-
guage, any number of government programs may be in jeopardy. Prior 
to the election, CCRI's supporters and opponents aired widely con-
flicting claims as to the effect of Proposition 209.6 Yet, decisions by 
courts faced with claims brought under Proposition 209 have only be-
gun. to nibble at the edges of the interpretive questions that section 
31(a) poses.7 None of court's decisions thus far have defined the rele-
vant terms, "discriminate" and "grant preferential treatment."s Moreo-
ver, scholarly analysis to date has focused on the constitutionality of 
CCRI9 or its socio-political implications;1O only a few commentators 
have addressed the legal meaning of the initiative's controversial lan-
guage. 11 
Ironically, although doubts over the initiative's validity under the 
Federal Constitution may have overshadowed consideration as to its 
practical effects as a matter of California law, in fact, a question of state 
law interpretation lies at the heart of that dispute. Proposition 209's 
5. The full text of clause (a) reads as follows: "The state shall not discriminate 
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, 
sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public 
education, or public contracting." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31, cl. (a) (West 1999). 
6. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
7. See Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. San Jose, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885 (Ct. App. 
1998) (outreach requirement in municipal contracting); Kidd v. People, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 758 (1998) (affirmative action in state civil service); Wilson v. State Personnel Bd., 
No. 96CS01082, (Cal. Supp. Ct., Dept. 33, Nov. 30, 1998) (examining various state 
affirmative action statutes). 
8. See, e.g., Hi-Voltage, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885 (no definition given); Wilson v. State 
Personnel Bd., No. 96CS01082, (Cal. Supp. Ct., Dept. 33, Nov. 30, 1998) (noting only 
that "Proposition 209 appears to mirror federal and state equal protection guarantees"). 
9. See, e.g., Vikram Amar & Evan Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Burdens, 
and the CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019 (1996); Note, The Constitutionaliry of 
Proposition 209, III HARV. L. REv. 2081 (1998); Note, Proposition 209 Does Not 
Impose Unconstitutional Burdens, 39 B.C. L. REV. 476 (1998). 
10. See, e.g., Comment, A World Without Color: The California Civil Rights Initia-
tive and the Future of Affirmative Action, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 235 (1997); Derrik 
A. Bell, Jr., California's Proposition 209: A Temporary Diversion on the Road to Ra-
cial Disaster. 30 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1447 (1997). 
11. Most discussion of Proposition 209' s legal effects published prior to the election' 
resembled partisan advocacy with little or no detailed analysis. The one exception was 
Neil Gotanda et aI., Legal Implications of Proposition 209-The California Civil 
Rights Initiative. 24 CAL. W. L. REv. 1. 17 (1996). Since the election, only one law 
review article has tackled the interpretation of CCRI. See Eugene Volokh. The Califor-
nia Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide. 44 UCLA L. REv. 1335. 1341 (1997). 
As will be made clear below. the present article adopts an interpretation that differs in 
important respects from both of these prior efforts. 
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constitutionality hinged, in part, on the ability of its defenders to distin-
guish two key Supreme Court precedentsl2 on which the plaintiffs re-
lied. CCRI's defenders argued that unlike these earlier cases, Proposi-
tion 209 only applies to "zero-sum" contexts, i.e. those in which prefer-
ences to minorities work as a dir~ct disadvantage to nonminority inter-
ests. 13 In issuing his preliminary injunction, Judge Henderson chal-
lenged this interpretation by observing that the facial language of 
"PJ:oposition 209 prohibits all race and gender preferences, not merely 
those that operate in a 'zero-sum' fashion.,,14 Unsurprisingly, the ap-
pellate panel that reversed him reached the opposite conclusion.15 
At root, the dispute between the district and circuit court thus 
concerned the meaning of "preferential treatment" in section 31(a). The 
Ninth Circuit read that phrase as encompassing a narrower scope than 
the district court. The opinions of federal judges hardly constitute dis-
positive authority as to the proper interpretation of a provision of state 
12. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 
U.S. 385 (1969). 
13. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1502 (N.D. Cal. 
1996) ("On this theory, Proposition 209 is distinguishable from the initiatives in Seattle 
and Hunter because it only interferes with 'zero-sum' antidiscrimination efforts-those 
that help minorities, but do so at the expense of nonminorities."). The distinction at 
issue was elaborated in an earlier Ninth Circuit case, Associated Gen. Contractors v. 
San Francisco Unif. Sch. Dist., 616 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1980), using slightly different 
terminology. That court distinguished between two main types of government pro-
grams: (1) "'reshuffle programs' [i.e. non-zero-sum], in which the state neither gives to 
nor withholds from anyone any benefits because of that person's group status, but 
rather ensures that everyone in every group enjoys the same rights in the same place. 
The most common examples are school desegregation cases and programs . . . (2) 
'stacked deck' [i.e. zero-sum] programs, in which the state specifically favors members 
of minorities in the competition with members of the majority for benefits that the state 
can give to some citizens but not to all. This category includes affirmative action pro-
grams of both the quota and 'positive factor' variety (but not programs that merely 
encourage more minority persons to apply for state conferred benefits)." /d. at 1386 
(internal footnotes omitted). 
14. See Coalition for £Con. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1503 n.24. 
15. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 707 n.16 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Associated Gen., 616 F.2d at 1381) ("The district court perceived no relevant 
difference between the [non-zero-sum] busing programs at issue in Seattle and the 
racial preference programs at issue here. We have recognized, however, that '[zero-
sum] programs ... trench on Fourteenth Amendment values in ways that [non-zero-
sum] programs ... do not. "'). The Ninth Circuit thus implicitly interpreted the prefer-
ences prohibited by Proposition 209 as confined to zero-sum contexts. Cf Coalition for 
£Con. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 702 ("When the government prefers individuals on ac-
count of their race or gender, it correspondingly disadvantages individuals who fortui-
tously belong to another race or to the other gender"). Id. 
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law. 16 Yet, their disagreement highlights a profound ambiguity as to the 
reach of section 31(a)'s central provision. Although Proposition 209 
was clearly intended to eliminate zero-sum programs such as affirma-
tive action preferences,17 its ramifications in such non-zero-sum con-
texts as outreach, minority scholarships, voter districting, and voluntary 
school desegregation remain unclear. IS Until the California courts have 
passed on the legitimacy of such programs, a broad area of uncertainty 
thus remains concerning the effect of CCRI's constitutional prohibi-
tions. 
This article focuses on one part of this unresolved interpretive is-
sue. It will examine whether, and to what extent, section 31 applies to 
voluntary school desegregation programs that use racial criteria to as-
sign students to public schools, i.e. "busing.,,19 Busing represents the 
archetypal non-zero-sum program contemplated in the constitutional 
litigation. 20 Moreover, such programs remain in widespread use 
throughout the state. In the aftermath of Proposition 209, their consti-
tutionality has been called into question in court filings,21 in public 
16. Cf Kopp v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n., 905 P.2d 1248 (1995) (citing both 
state and federal authorities for the proposition that state interpretations control for state 
statutes). Of course, to the extent that the constitutionality of Proposition 209 actually 
hinged on the narrower definition controlling, one would expect a state court to con-
form the meaning of the initiative to the demands of the federal constitution. See Rowe 
v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625 (Ct. App. 1993) (duty of court to interpret stat-
ute in way that minimizes potential for conflict with constitution). This article ex-
presses no opinion as to the merits of such an argument. However, to the extent that it 
does apply, the following analysis will serve to provide a theoretical framework by 
which a California court could accommodate its interpretation of the initiative to such 
an external imperative. 
17. See infra Section III for a discussion of the intent of CCRI. 
18. Only two California courts to date have ruled on Proposition 209's application 
to non-zero-sum programs. Both cases addressed minority outreach requirements and 
reached opposing results. Compare Wilson v. State Personnel Bd., No. 96CS01082 
(Cal. Supp. Ct., Dept. 33, Nov. 30, 1998) (upholding outreach as non-preferential), with 
Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. San Jose, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885 (1998) (holding that 
outreach requirements violate section 31). See also Lungren v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 690 (Ct. App. 1996) (pre-election decision assuming that Proposition 209 
would not affect outreach). 
19. As explained below, busing describes a range of programs involving race-based 
assignments and need not involve the physical transportation of students from one 
neighborhood to another. See infra Section IV.A. and accompanying text. 
20. See Coalitionfor £Con. Equity, 122 F.3d at 707 n.16. 
21. The legality of voluntary desegregation under section 31 was formally chal-
lenged by the plaintiffs in Board of Educ., San Diego Unif. Sch. Dist. v. Superior 
Court, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (1998). This case considered the termination of a desegre-
gation consent decree. The court sidestepped the issue, however, in its resolution of the 
case. See id. at 563. There are indications that this issue may surface again soon in the 
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statements by officials,22 and in scholarly commentary.23 This article 
challenges such interpretations, arguing that CCRI's prohibitions. do 
not extend to voluntary desegregation in the form of busing. 
Although the analysis of section 31 presented below pertains to 
the specific context of busing, the article envisions a more general in-
terpretive methodology. It explicitly considers the meaning of, and re-
lationship between, section 31(a)'s twin prohibitions on discrimination 
and preferential treatment. Moreover, by expanding on the zero-
sumlnon-zero-sum distinction advanced in the constitutional litigation, 
the article's conclusions hold obvious implications for other state pro-
grams that fallon one side or the other of the zero-sumlnon-zero-sum 
line.24 . 
Part I provides an overview of voluntary desegregation and dis-
cusses the legal basis under which such programs operate. Part II de-
scribes the methodology used to interpret voter initiatives in California. 
Then, Part ill surveys the evidence of voter intent implicated by this 
interpretive methodology. Part IV addresses the threshold question of 
whether busing is discriminatory under section 31. Part V considers the 
more serious interpretive challenge issued by section 31' s prohibition 
of preferential treatment. Next, Part VI applies the understanding of 
preferential treatment developed in Part V to the specific context of 
desegregative busing. In conclusion, Part VII connects voluntary deseg-
regation with the more general zero-sumlnon-zero-sum distinction that 
may be implicit in Proposition 209. 
courts. In 1997, the Pacific Legal Foundation served the Berkeley Unified School Dis-
trict with a public record request. Given the foundation's long history of mounting legal 
challenges to race-based government programs, the request is seen as a prelude to pos-
sible litigation. See Interview with Celia Ruiz, of Ruiz & Sperow, an attorney special-
izing in education law (Nov. 4, 1998). 
22. Joseph Symkowick, general counsel of the California Department of Education, 
before the election publicly stated his belief that race-based desegregation programs, 
including busing, would violate Proposition 209. See Bettina Boxall, Proposition 209: 
A Blueprintfor Court Fights, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1996, at A3. 
23. See Volokh, supra note II, at 1344 & n.27 (concluding that CCRI forbids race-
based school assignments). 
24. In addition, the recent passage of Proposition 200 in Washington State, a voter 
initiative with virtually identical language to that of Proposition 209, means that the 
interpretation of these terms has significance outside of California as well. CCRI pro-
ponents hope to pass similar measures in other states. See Affirmative Action Suffers 
Setback, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Nov. 4, 1998, at A2. 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF VOLUNTARY DESEGREGATION IN CALIFORNIA 
A. TYPES OF DESEGREGATION PROGRAMS 
Before embarking on the legal arguments pertaining to desegre-
gation, it may prove helpful to offer some background information on 
the range of desegregation programs currently in place in California. 
Desegregation plans attempt to counteract racial imbalances in the dis-
tribution of students within the schools of a given district.25 In general, 
there are two main types of desegregation plans: those carried out pur-
suant to a court order and those voluntarily adopted26 by a school dis-
trict. This article focuses exclusively on voluntary desegregation. 27 
Due to the decentralized nature of these programs, the exact fig-
ures are difficult to obtain. It is estimated that roughly fifty school dis-
tricts in California practice some form of voluntary desegregation. 28 
Such plans typically involve a combination of approaches, which may 
include any of the following three main components of desegregation: 
busing, magnet schools, and special funding to "racially isolated 
schools.,,29 
Busing represents the oldest and most direct approach to desegre-
gation. It involves assigning of students whose racial group predomi-
nates in a given school to other schools within the district where a dif-
25. Because such programs aim towards achieving racially integrated schools, the 
terms desegregation and integration tend to be used synonymously. 
26. Voluntary here should be read to mean uncoerced by any judicial decree. As 
discussed below, the California Supreme Court has held that school districts have a 
constitutional obligation under state law to adopt "voluntary" integration plans to re-
dress segregated conditions. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. Cf Tinsley v. 
Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 643, 650 n.2 (Cal. App. Ct. 1983) (commenting on the 
tautological nature of a duty to volunteer). 
27. The status of court-ordered desegregation plans, in any case, would appear 
largely unaffected by Proposition 209. Any such plans mandated by federal law, of 
course, would preempt section 31 under the Supremacy Clause. Court-ordered busing 
under state law grounds is already forbidden under the California Constitution. See 
CAL. CONST. § 7, cI. (a). Finally, section 31 explicitly exempts existing court orders or 
consent decrees in effect prior to the initiative's passage. See CAL. CONST. § 31, cl. (d). 
28. See Interview with David Walrath, of Murdoch, Walrath & Holmes, education 
lobbyist in Sacramento, California (Nov. 12, 1998). Neither the State Superintendent of 
Public Schools nor the State Budget Comptrollers' office appear to keep tabs on how 
state funding for desegregation plans is used. Therefore, most of the information about 
current desegregation practices is anecdotal. 
29. See generally CAL. EDUC. CODE § 42249 (West 1999) (listing the types of de-
segregation programs eligible for state funding). 
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ferent racial group comprises the majority and vice versa.30 Busing 
proved controversial in the 1970s, leading many school districts to 
adopt less coercive integration strategies.3) 
Magnet schools represent one such approach. As the name sug-
gests, magnet schools offer special enrichment programs designed to 
attract students from all across the district and, thereby, achieve a di-
verse student population. Such schools typically have competitive ad-
mission standards and often award preferences to underrepresented 
racial groups in order to ensure a balanced outcome. A second ap-
proach allocates special funding directly to schools with a dispropor-
tionate number of minority students to compensate for the educational 
burden of "racial isolation.,,32 
Because both magnet schools and funding to "racially isolated 
schools" typically confer special benefits only to certain racial groups, 
these approaches to desegregation appear more intrinsically preferential 
than busing, which equally affects students from all races. Such pro-
grams, however, present a more problematic case with respect to sec- . 
tion 31' s prohibition on preferential treatment. 33 This article will re-
strict its analysis to busing.34 . 
Busing, or related schemes for pupil reassignments, remains a 
mainstay of voluntary desegregation plans throughout the state.35 None 
30. The term busing serves as a convenient shorthand description for any desegre-
gation plan that relies on reciprocal student reassignments. The term is something of a 
misnomer as "busing" need not entail the physical transportation of students across 
town. The term, however, is widely used in the literature, and accordingly, this article 
will adhere to such convention. See generally NAACP v. San Bernardino City Unif. 
Sch. Dist., 551 P .2d 48, 52 n.8 (Cal. App. Ct. 1976). 
31. See Walrath, supra, note 28. 
32. See id.; see generally CAL EDUC. CODE § 42247 et. seq. (West 1999) (surveying 
the types of voluntary desegregation plans eligible for state funding). 
33. For this reason, the Legislative Analyst singled out these two types of programs 
and omitted busing as examples of desegregation programs that might be invalidated by 
Proposition 209. See infra note 121 and accompanying text. Many of these programs 
receive federal funding. To the extent that the continuance of race-conscious policies is 
an explicit precondition for such funding, some might qualify for the exception under 
section 31(e). See infra note 84. An examination of the factual and legal issues raised 
by such speCUlation, however, lies beyond the scope of this article. 
34. No federal funding is currently available for busing. See Walrath, supra note 28. 
Therefore, the permissibility of such programs will likely stand or fall according to 
whether or not they are deemed preferential under section 31(a). 
35. A spokesperson for the California Voluntary School Desegregation Association 
declined to comment as to the extent that race factors into public school assignments. 
Most school districts shun the political and legal difficulties, which would accompany 
public scrutiny of their policies. One knowledgeable observer, however, estimated that 
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of the school districts that practiced busing prior to CCRI appear to 
have abandoned their programs in its aftermath.36 Moreover, the State 
Assembly continues to fund voluntary desegregation programs of all 
stripes.37 
B. THE SPECIAL STATUS OF VOLUNTARY DESEGREGATION UNDER 
CAUFORNIA STATE LAw 
Voluntary desegregation programs have a unique status under 
California law. They are both specifically sanctioned by the state con-
stitution and constitutionally required under prevailing case law in cer-
tain circumstances. Section 7 of the California Constitution, which 
largely parallels the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution, explicitly declares that "nothing herein shall prohibit the gov-
erning board of a school district from voluntarily continuing or com-
mencing a school integration plan .... ,,38 
This portion of section 7 was inserted via constitutional initiative, 
like section 31. Section 7' s initiative arose in reaction to the California 
Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Board. of Educ. of Los An-
geles,39 which held that segregation in public schools, regardless of its 
cause, violated the equal protection clause of the state constitution.4o In 
doing so, the court imposed a higher standard under state law than fed-
eral equal protection standards, which limited redress to instances of 
intentional de jure segregation.41 Crawford proved controversial be-
at least ten school districts use some form of racial criteria in determining student as-
signments for non-magnet schools. See Ruiz, supra note 21. In addition, the California 
Education Code permits school districts to block interdistrict transfer applications 
where such transfer "would negatively impact ... the racial and ethnic balance of the 
district"--even without the existence of a formal voluntary desegregation plan in op-
eration. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48209(b). It is unclear to what extent such discretion is 
exercised. If one assumes, however, that adjoining districts act reciprocally to maintain 
their respective racial balances, the following analysis based on intra-district busing 
would seem applicable to that scenario as well. 
36. See Interview with Celia Ruiz, supra note 21. 
37. See Board of Educ., San Diego Unif. Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 562, 567-68 o 998}. 
38. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. (a). 
39. 551 P.2d 28 (1976). 
40. The Court made an important distinction between a mere imbalance in racial 
distribution and segregation, which is judged subjectively with respect to a number of 
variables. Id. at 43-44. Therefore, to the extent that subsequent arguments in this article 
rely on this decision, it will be necessary to assume that desegregation is aimed at alle-
viating conditions of segregation in the sense understood by the Crawford court. 
41. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413 (1977); Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,28 (1971). 
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cause it paved the way for court-ordered mandatory busing of students 
. h 42 m testate. 
California's electorate responded by approving Proposition I, 
which forbade California courts from ordering busing based on state 
law grounds.43 The initiative, however, did not overturn the legal 
precedents on which such busing had been based. Thus, segregated 
schools remain in violation of California's Constitution.44 The only 
thing the initiative did was limit the availability of a particular form of 
remedy for that violation-court-ordered busing.45 
Furthermore, the initiative specifically failed to disavow another 
aspect of the Crawford decision. In finding that de facto segregation 
denied equal protection, the California Supreme Court held that school 
districts have an affirmative duty to take independent action to remedy 
segregated conditions.46 Other cases had suggested that busing may be 
specifically required as a remedy.47 Although after Proposition I, courts 
could no longer order busing to enforce this duty, school districts re-
tained the option to do so voluntarily. Indeed, as noted, the initiative 
inserted language into section 7 specifically preserving the ability of 
school boards to enact voluntary desegregation plans. 
Accordingly, the legal status of voluntary desegregation, and 
busing specifically, rested on solid constitutional footing prior to the 
enactment of Proposition 209. The question addressed in this article is 
whether the constitutional amendments affected by ccru override ex-
isting law in this area. To answer this question, it may prove helpful to 
review the California courts' methodology in interpreting initiatives. 
42. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 531 (1982) (citing Crawford v. 
Board of Educ., 551 P.2d 28, 48 (Cal. 1976». 
43. See id. at 531-32 & nn.5-6. 
44. See McKinny v. Oxnard Union High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 642 P.2d 460, 
467-68 (Cal. 1982). 
45. /d. 
46. See Crawford, 551 P.2d at 43. 
47. See Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 530 P.2d 605, 618 (Cal. 1975) 
(holding a statute barring race-based student assignments in public schools unconstitu-
tional). San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 479 P.2d 669, 683 (Cal. 1971) 
(race-based pupil assignments "will often be the only effective device to eliminate de 
facto segregation"). 
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III. INTERPRETING INITIATIVES 
Despite the increasing prominence of voter-enacted legislation as 
a national phenomenon48 and a host of high-profile California initia-
tives of late,49 the peculiar interpretive demands posed by this form of 
direct democracy have received comparatively little attention in schol-
arly literature.5o California courts have likewise tended to downplay 
any special distinctions in their interpretation of ballot legislation, often 
drawing an explicit parallel between initiatives and conventional stat-
utes.51 
In California, interpretation of written law in California is 
grounded, at least formally, in an intentionalist mode1.52 "When con-
struing a constitutional provision enacted by initiative, the intent of the 
voters is the paramount consideration.,,53 In discerning voter intent, 
courts look first to the words of the initiative, considering extraneous 
sources only if the statute proves ambiguous on its face.54 Words are 
given their ordinary and usual meanings,55 and the standard rules of 
. I 56 statutory constructIOn app y. 
One such principle of interpretation of particular relevance to 
Proposition 209 is the "almost irresistible" presumption that "when an 
48. See Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas in 
Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 108-109 (1995) (noting that a majority of states 
now allow some version of direct democracy: initiatives, referenda, etc.). 
49. See, e.g., California Civil Rights Initiative (1995). 
50. See Schacter, supra note 48, at 108. 
5!. See DaPonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140,145 (Cal. 1992) ("These principles 
apply as much to initiative statutes as to those enacted by the Legislature."). Id.; People 
v. Callegri, 202 Cal. Rptr. 109, liS (Ct. App. 1984), overruled by People v. Bouzas, 
807 P.2d 1076 (Cal. 1991) ("fundamental rule of statutory construction ... [a]pplies 
with equal force to initiative measures"); Winnett v. Roberts, 225 Cal. Rptr. 82, 86 (Ct. 
App. 1986) (noting that a constitutional initiative should be read like any other consti-
tutional provision). 
52. See generally CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1859 (West 1997). 
53. Davis v. City of Berkeley, 794 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1990); Board of Supervisors 
v. Lonergan, 616 P.2d 802,824 (Cal. 1980). 
54. See Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633,668 (Cal. 1994); Davis, 794 P.2d at 900; 
55. See Up-Right, 828 P.2d at 144. 
56. See Lungren v. Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299, 304 (Cal. 1988) (interpretation of 
individual words in a way that takes into account the context and structure of the entire 
text). See also Consumers Union v. California Milk Producers Advisory Bd., 147 Cal. 
Rptr. 265, 272 n.7 (Ct. App. 1978); Winnett, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (legislative intent 
gleaned from the whole can inform the reading of each part). These rules can some-
times justify extreme results. See, e.g., People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 758-59 (Cal. 
1985) (construing the conjunction "and" as "or" based on perceived intent of the rele-
vant section). 
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initiative contains terms that have been judicially construed ... those 
terms have been used in the precise and technical sense in which they 
have been used by the courtS.,,57 A related canon of construction states 
that language used within a single body of law is ordinarily assumed to 
have a consistent meaning.58 As with any interpretive approach, such 
rules have natural limits.59 Comparisons out of context may mislead. 
Some terms may appear in more than one place, leading to conflicting 
results.60 As always, the touchstone must remain voter intent.61 
Furthermore, even after applying these rules of construction, am-
biguities may thus persist. To resolve them, courts have turned to three 
main categories of extrinsic sources: (1) arguments and summaries 
found in the ballot pamphlet, (2) historical context, and (3) contempo-
raneous construction by the legislature or relevant administrative agen-
cies.62 
The ballot pamphlet materials accompanying initiatives represent 
the closest analogue to a conventional statute's legislative history. As 
such, they are widely relied upon as indicia of voter intent.63 The 
weight, however, accorded to their content varies.64 In Hill v. National 
Collegiate Athletics Ass'n,65 the California Supreme Court displayed 
57. Hill, 865 P.2d at 646. 
58. See Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 576-77 (Cal. 1995) (Mosk, J., dissenting); 
Stephen H. Sutro, Comment, Interpretation of Initiative~ by Reference to Similar Stat-
utes: Canons of Construction Do Not Adequately Measure Voter Intent, 34 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 945, 957-58 (1994). 
59. See Rossi, 889 P.2d at 575-76 (Mosk, 1., dissenting) (accusing majority of inap-
propriate "hypertechnical" use of canons to override voter intent); cf Consumers Un-
ion, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 273 n.7 (acknowledging that almost every principle of construc-
tion has a counterpart to the opposite effect). 
60. Both of these concerns apply with respect to discrimination, a key concept in 
Proposition 209. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
61. See Creighton v. City of Santa Monica, 207 Cal. Rptr. 78, 83 (1984) ("The 
words must be understood ... as the words of the voters who adopted the amendment. 
They are to be understood in the common popular way, and in the absence of some 
strong and convincing reason to the contrary ... they are not entitled to be considered 
in a technical sense inconsistent with their popular meaning."). 
62. See generally Kara Christenson, Note, Interpreting the Purposes of Initiatives: 
Proposition 65, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1031,1043 (1989). 
63. See Lungren v. Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299, 307 n.14 (Cal. 1988) (ballot pam-
phlet serves as legislative history); Kidd v. State, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758, 770 n.7 (Ct. 
App. 1998); Creighton, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 82-83. 
64. See 1. Clark Kelso, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy, 19 PEPP. L. 
REv. 327, 358 (1992) (discussing the selective weight given to ballot pamphlet by 
courts). 
65. 865 P.2d 633, 645 n.5 (Cal. 1994). 
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three different approaches even within the same decision. When in-
quiring whether Proposition 11 covered private entities, the court 
pointed to various references in the ballot pamphlet in arguing that a 
"reasonable voter" would have answered affirmatively.66 In a subse-
quent section of the opinion, however, the court brushed aside ballot 
language supporting an interpretation with which it disagreed, as mere 
"sound-bite rhetoric.,,67 In still a later section of the opinion, the court 
returned to the ballot argument, citing references to the United States 
Constitution as a basis of implicating federal constitutional standards as 
an interpretive guide.68 This approach has direct relevance to the inter-
pretation of Proposition 209, whose ballot argument might also thereby 
incorporate by reference federal statutory standards.69 
As voter enactment of an initiative presumably reflects endorse-
merit of the argument in its favor, courts tend to focus on the propo-
nents' arguments.70 As such, initiative sponsors' views become equated 
with the voters' intent?' The interplay between the arguments and re-
buttals on both sides, however, may prove insightful on a particular 
point.72 
The Ballot Pamphlet also includes a report from the Legislative 
Analyst offering a more objective analysis of the propositions before 
the voters. Courts look to this report as a source of guidance through 
the partisan arguments. 73 
In addition to ballot pamphlet materials, the historical context in 
which an initiative came to be enacted can also shed light on voter in-
66. /d. at 649. But see Russel v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. Rptr. 102, 108 (1986) 
(passing reference in one ballot argument not sufficient to demonstrate intent). 
67. Hill, 865 P.2d at 646 n.5. 
68. Id. at 649. 
69. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
70. See California Hous. Fin. Agency v. Patitucci, 583 P.2d 729, 733 (Cal. 1978). 
71. See People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111, 115 (Cal. 1985) (referring to intent of 
"framers" and "drafters" interchangeably with that of the voters). One court even con-. 
sidered statements made by an initiative sponsor outside of the ballot pamphlet. See 
Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 563 (Cal. 1995). The court ruled that as long as vote~s 
could be deemed aware of such statements, in the absence of contrary evidence, it 
could presume that "the drafter's intent and understanding of the measure was shared 
by the electorate." Id. at 563 n.7. 
72. See, e.g., Hill, 865 P.2d at 645 (proponents narrowly characterize initiative's 
effect when pressed to rebut opponents' criticisms); Lungren, 755 P.2d at 307-08 ("The 
references to a public 'need to know' and to information 'legitimately needled], by 
government serve to limit and narrow the prior reference to 'compelling public inter-
est. ", 
73. See, e.g., People v. Vega-Hernandez, 225 Cal. Rptr. 209, 217 (Ct. App. 1986); 
Winnett v. Roberts, 225 Cal. Rptr. 82, 86 (Ct. App. 1986). 
HeinOnline -- 21 Whittier L. Rev. 15 1999-2000
1999] IS BUSING PREFERENTIAL? 15 
tent.74 The idea is to situate the initiative within the "social and political 
milieu that [then] existed.,,75 The evidentiary basis behind such histori-
cism, however, is often unclear.76 Courts may cite legislation77 or court 
decisions 78 that preceded the ballot measure. References in the ballot 
arguments often enable courts to place an initiative in context.79 Yet, 
although courts largely restrict themselves to considering official mate-
rials,80 sometimes contextual evidence may be supplied by less formal 
sources.8! 
The third major source of extrinsic guidance available to courts is 
the int~rpretations made by the legislature and/or appropriate adminis-
trative agencies.82 Courts will usually defer to such contemporaneous 
constructions.83 Their reasons may include a desire to promote consis-
tency and confidence in government institutions,84 a concern that the 
public may have relied on existing interpretations,85 and an awareness 
that agencies charged with implementing a particular initiative provi-
sion might possess specialized expertise unavailable to the courtS.86 The 
political branches are more attuned to the popular will, hence their 
views also offer some indication of voter intent. 87 
74. See, e.g., Rossi, 889 P.2d at 563 n.7; Davis v. City of Berkeley, 794 P.2d 897, 
901 (Cal. 1990). 
75. Creighton v. City of Santa Monica, 207 Cal. Rptr. 78,83 (Ct. App. 1984). 
76. The court in Creighton describes "inflationary trends," "continual rise in rental 
costs," and "the growing phenomenon of condominium conversion" without citation to 
authority. Id. 
77. See, e.g., Consumers Union v. California Milk Producers Advisory Bd., 147 Cal. 
Rptr. 265, 269 (Ct. App. 1978). 
78. See, e.g., Davis, 794 P.2d at 901-02. 
79. See Winnett v. Roberts, 225 Cal. Rptr. 82, 86 (Ct. App. 1986). 
80. See Schachter, supra note 48, at 121-22 (analyzing initiative cases according to 
the type of interpretive materials they examine). 
81. See California Hous. Fin. Agency v. Patitucci, 583 P.2d 729, 733 (Cal. 1978) 
(referring to messages contained in newspaper and campaign literature generally); 
Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 
1281, 1291 (Cal. 1978) (taking judicial notice of pUblicity and public discussion of 
initiative's effects); Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 564 (Cal. 1995) (citing account of 
Franklin Hichborn, a contemporary observer of the relevant period). 
82. See Davis, 794 P.2d at 904-07 (considering interpretation by local public agen-
cies, opinion of attorney general, and action by legislature). 
83. See id.; see also Rossi, 889 P.2d at 563 n.6. 
84. See Davis, 794 P.2d at 904. 
85. Id. at 911 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
86. See Christenson, supra note 62, at 1049. 
87. See id. But see Rossi, 889 P.2d at 563 n.6 (contemporary construction may be 
considered if it sheds light on legislative intent). 
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None of these considerations seem to hold much force in Proposi-
tion 209's case. Far from promoting consistency, a search for contem-
poraneous constructions would prove an exercise in futility. The initia-
tive touches on so many government actors at so many levels that it 
would be impossible to elicit any authoritative guidance. Moreover, the 
broad, abstract language employed by section 31 does not seem amena-
ble to the technical expertise of any government agency. Indeed, the 
only government institution whose expertise qualifies it to expound on 
constitutional provisions is the judiciary. The Legislative Analyst's 
report warned voters that a definitive analysis of Proposition 209 would 
require a court to rule on the meaning of "preferential treatment." Un-
der such circumstances, it would seem appropriate that California 
courts retain unfettered discretion to do so. Nonetheless, because the 
contemporaneous construction of government officials connected with 
voluntary desegregation may be of marginal relevance, such evidence 
will be considered briefly below. 
IV. EVIDENCE OF VOTER INTENT 
Having explored the basic approach that courts use to interpret 
initiatives, this article will now apply that methodology to Proposition 
209 to determine whether voluntary desegregation violates section 31. 
It seems clear that voluntary desegregation would be considered as "in 
the operation of public education" as required by section 31(a) and 
qualifies as state action under that section.88 The only question is 
whether such programs "discriminate against, or grant preferential 
treatment to any individual or group on the basis of race .... ,,89 
The answer to this question un surprisingly hinges on the meaning 
of the two terms "discriminate" and "preferential treatment." Deter-
mining the meaning of "discriminate" presents the easier challenge. As 
88. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31, cl. (a), (t). Clause (t) states that "[f]or the purposes of 
this section, 'state' shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the state itself, any 
city, county ... school district, special district, or any other political subdivision or 
governmental instrumentality of or within the state." [d. at cl. (t). (emphasis added). 
89. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31, cl. (a). Desegregation programs may also involve state 
action on the basis of ethnicity or national origin-also prohibited criteria under Propo-
sition 209-but for simplicity only race will be considered here. In addition, Clause (e) 
creates a loophole for "action which must be taken to establish or maintain eligibility 
for any federal program, where ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to 
the state." [d. at cl. (e). This article will not consider in detail the extent to which spe-
cific voluntary desegregation programs may qualify for an exemption under this provi-
sion; however, in general, the federal government does not offer funds for busing, so 
section 31(e) would seem not to apply. See infra note 139. 
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a term of art construed in countless judicial opinions, a court can as-
sume the voters read the word in light of this backdrop of existing law. 
For reasons discussed below, 'discriminate' in section 31 most likely 
takes its meaning from the case law interpreting California's equal 
protection clause.9o 
Construing 'preferential treatment' presents a greater interpretive 
challenge because it is a comparatively novel phrase. Dictionaries de-
fine preferential as "offering or constituting an advantage.',9! An even 
more precise contextual use of such terminology, however, occurs in 
affirmative action case law. This article considers such contextual us-
age relevant because of the strong associations between Proposition 
209 and affirmative action. Before elaborating on these connections, it 
is worth noting that the word preference also appears elsewhere in the 
California Constitution, most notably in Article I, section 4, which 
guarantees "[t]ree exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimi-
nation or preference.',92 Although the context of these religious protec-
tions differs significantly from that of Proposition 209,93 the meaning 
given to "preference" in cases construing section 4 helps confirm con-
clusions derived in the affirmative action context. 
90. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
91. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1787 (3d ed. 1976); See also 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1428 (3d ed. 1996) 
("giving advantage"). 
92. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4. Furthennore, this is the only other place in which both 
discriminate and preference appear together in the California Constitution. 
93. Differences in the underlying nature of the criteria being protected-religion 
activity vs. group status-would doubtless make a court hesitate to push any analogy 
between these two sections too far. Religion cases under section 4 raise issues that are 
analytically distinct from those raised by race. For example, not only must one compare 
treatment between religions, but one must also consider the treatment of nonreligions-
a dimension not present with respect to racial groups. Moreover, free exercise cases run 
into an inherent tension with the establishment clause as government walks the narrow 
line separating church and state. No similar difficulty exists when dealing with racial 
discrimination. Because of these doctrinal complexities, the meaning of discrimination 
and preference could not readily be imported directly from section 4 to section 31. 
Nonetheless, given that Proposition 209 inserts section 31 into the same article as this 
existing provision, one could expect their common language to receive a parallel con-
struction in some respects. Therefore, it may be plausible to posit some congruence in 
the scope of these tenns, especially to the extent that it accords with other independent 
bases for reaching the same result. 
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The legislative history of Proposition 209 confirms that affrrma-
tive action was the primary target of the initiative.94 The historical 
context of the campaign, in particular, reveals that CCRI was almost 
exclusively presented to the voters as a referendum on affirmative ac-
tion.95 In addition, a court could look at a number of potentially salient 
events, prior to or contemporaneous with the initiative campaign, that 
reinforce this association. The passage of SP-l and SP-2 eliminated 
affirmative action preferences' in University of California admissions 
and hiring, respectively, a year earlier.96 Governor Wilson issued an 
executive order97 and then filed lawsuits against his own government to 
end similar preferences in other state-run programs.98 Affirmative ac-
tion also emerged as a national issue during the Republican primary in 
the 1996 Presidential campaign.99 This prompted President Clinton's 
"mend, don't end" slogan, accompanied by his order of a comprehen-
sive review of federal affirmative action programs. 100 
News coverage of Proposition 209 linked all of these events to the 
initiative's campaign. lOl Many nationwide, including California, re-
flected growing doubts as to the continued necessity for and legitimacy 
of affirmative action as public policy.102 Each event can also be linked 
94. Cf Kidd v. People, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758, 770 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating that the 
clear intent of the voters in favor of Proposition 209 was to end affirmative action pref-
erences). 
95. See Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130, 142 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997) (characterizing 
Proposition 209 as an "anti-affirmative action referendum"); Charles Oliver, Race and 
the Numbers Racket; Affirmative Action, 27 REASON 32 (1995) ("The future of affirma-
tive action may depend on a California ballot initiative"); see also Errol Smith, An 
Initiative That Can Accomplish King's Dream: Civil Rights: Affirmative Action Has 
Come to Mean Double Standards and Color-Based Prejudice, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
1995, at B7 (if [CCRI] "passed ... it would bring an abrupt end to affirmative action"). 
[d. . 
96. See SP-l: Resolution of the University of California Board of Regents Adopting 
a Policy "Ensuring Equal Treatment" of Admissions, July 20, 1995, in REPRESEN-
TATIONS, issue 55 (Summer 1996). 
97. Exec. Order No. W -124-95, Executive Order to End Preferential Treatment and 
to Promote Individual Opportunity Based on Merit, June I, 1995. 
98. See Wilson Attacks Calif. Affirmative Action Programs, SET-ASIDE ALERT, Vol. 
3, No. 18, Aug. 28, 1995. 
99. See Steven Holmes, G.O.P. Lawmakers Offer a Ban on Federal Affirmative 
Action, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1995, at AI. 
100. See Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 
1995, at § 6, p. 36. 
101. [d.; B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Fighting Affirmative Action, Leader's Race Looms 
Large, N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 1996, at All; Terry Eastland, ccru Struggles On Against 
Critic and G.O.P. Cowardice, THE AM. SPECTATOR, Nov. 1996. 
102. See Lemann, supra note 100. 
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to a concerted effort by Governor Wilson and others in the Republican 
Party to tap into opposition to affirmative action preferences as a basis 
for electoral support. 103 Governor Wilson's signature topped the list of 
sponsors of the principal ballot's Argument in Favor of CCRI, further 
reinforcing the association between Wilson's policies and the initiative 
in voters' minds. 104 For all of these reasons, any plausible interpretation 
of Proposition 209 must begin with the clear expression of voter intent 
to prohibit affIrmative action, at least as currently practiced in Califor-
nia. 
There is also a historical aspect to this debate that transcends re-
cent developments. The ballot pamphlet's Argument in Favor speaks to 
this historical context by invoking the notion of "original meaning." 
This idea crops up twice in the Argument. "Real 'affirmative action'" is 
described as having "originally meant no discrimination.,,105 Yet, the 
original meaning of the civil rights laws passed to prohibit discrimina-
tion is said to have been "hijacked" by "special interests [who] ... im-
posed quotas, preferences, and set-asides.,,106 The message imparted is 
that preferential affIrmative action represents a betrayal of the ideals of 
the civil rights movement. 107 
Similar themes resonate throughout the opinions of certain con-
servative justices in the United State Supreme Court's affIrmative ac-
103. See Cathleen Decker & Maura Dolan, Wilson Suit Affects State But Targets 
Nation, L.A. TiMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at A3. Bill Stall & Virginia Ellis, Wilson Takes 
Swipe at Affirmative Action, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1995, at AI. 
104. See Secretary of State, California Ballot Pamphlet: General Election 30 (Nov. 5, 
1996) (Argument in Favor) [hereinafter Ballot Pamphlet]. Similarly, Ward Connerly's 
signature appeared right below Wilson's. As a Regent of the University of California, 
Connerly engineered the passage of SP-I, abolishing affirmative action within the 
University of California system. [d. See also Ayres, supra note 101. Connerly then 
spearheaded the pro-CCRl campaign, "promising to do for the entire state what [he] 
ha[d] done for the University of California." [d. 
105. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Argument in Favor. 
106. [d. 
107. The very title of Proposition 209-the California Civil Rights Initiative-rein-
forces its self-claimed connection to the struggle for civil rights. To reinforce this mes-
sage, CCRI supporters aired controversial televisions advertisements during the cam-
paign showing excerpts from Martin Luther King's famous "I Have a Dream" speech. 
See Dave Lesher, Protest Greets New Assault on Preferential Politics: Connerly 
Launches National Campaign on Martin Luther King's Jr. 's Birthday, Touching off 
Fierce Complaints, L.A. TiMES, Jan. 16, 1997, at A3 (describing commercials during 
CCRl campaign); see also Smith, supra note 95. 
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tion case law.108 This ongoing jurisprudential debate provides the grist 
for a contextual interpretation in which CCRI's preference ban assumes 
the guise of a patch to restore the fabric of discrimination law to its 
putative "original meaning.,,109 
The arguments in the Ballot Pamphlet further underscore the cen-
trality of affirmative action as the focus of the Proposition 209 cam-
paign. All four of the Arguments and Rebuttals as well as the Legisla-
tive Analyst's report repeatedly refer to affirmative action. 110 Propo-
nents of ccru emphasized that the initiative only banned preferential 
affirmative action, a set of policies that they characterized as departures 
from "real 'affirmative action.",lll Having so narrowed their rifle 
sights, CCRI's advocates gave no indication that the initiative had any 
other targets. 
The decision in Lungren v. Superior Court l12 is not contrary to 
this understanding of Proposition 209's purpose. In Lungren, a Califor-
nia appellate court overturned a writ of mandamus that CCRI oppo-
nents had obtained in a court below. The mandamus had directed the 
Attorney General to revise both his ballot title and label for Proposition 
209 to indicate that the purpose of the initiative was to prohibit af-
firmative action. 113 The court of appeal decried this judicial interven-
tion, holding that the Attorney General had adequately performed his 
statutory duty as it was. 114 In doing so, the court of appeal avoided any 
discussion as to what the actual purpose of CCRI might be. Indeed, the 
court of appeal stated that its conclusion held true "[e]ven if we assume 
that ... all of the impact of the prohibition will be borne by [affrrma-
. .] ,,115 bve actIOn programs. 
If affirmative action occupies center stage in the legal and elec-
toral context of Proposition 209, voluntary desegregation belongs very 
108. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,631-32 (1990) overruled by Ada-
rand Constr. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (characterizing 
majority decision as a throwback to race-conscious jurisprudence of Plessy v. 
Ferguson); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 676-77 (1986) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. at 203. See also United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 
U.S. 193, 219-20 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (lambasting majority as departing 
from previous understanding of Title VII). 
109. See infra notes 218-222, and accompanying text. 
110. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Analysis by Legislative Analyst. 
111. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Argument in Favor. 
112. 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Ct. App. 1996). 
113. See id. at 691. 
114. See id. at 693-95. 
115. [d. at 694 (emphasis added). 
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much on the periphery. As will be argued below, the legal basis of vol-
untary desegregation may not rest on the loophole in discrimination law 
that Proposition 209 sought to close. 116 Moreover, the legislative his-
tory of CCRI further suggests that busing was not among the initia-
tive's intended target~. 
Neither side had anything directly to say about voluntary desegre-
gation in the ballot arguments. 117 Although education is one of the three 
realms of state action to which CCRI applies, the Argument in Favor 
discussed only university admissions as being preferential. ll8 The Ar-
gument Against did address CCRI's impacts on lower education pro-
grams; 119 yet desegregation went unmentioned. 12o 
The Legislative Analyst's report, by contrast, devoted a paragraph 
to the initiative's possible affects on voluntary desegregation. Yet, the 
examples it gave ,of programs which CCRI "could eliminate or cause 
fundamental changes to [included] . . . (1) magnet schools (in those 
cases where race or ethnicity are preferential factors in the admission of 
students to the school) and (2) designated "racially isolated minority 
schools.,,121 The Analyst's singling out of these specific programs ar-
guably implies that only desegregation of these sorts would be affected. 
These types of programs represent departures from the paradig-
matic case of busing considered in this article. Indeed, preferential ad-
missions in magnet schools more closely resemble the zero-sum con-
text of affirmative action. And racially isolated schools receive special 
funding targeted to benefit specific minority student populations. 122 
Thus, they differ from busing plans, which operate district-wide and 
affect students of all races. 
Note also that, in either case, the Legislative Analyst merely states 
that these programs "could" be affected. 123 By contrast, the same report 
predicted that affirmative action programs "would" be prohibited-a 
far more definite auxiliary verb. 124 
116. See infra note 218. 
117. See generally Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104. 
118. See id. at Argument in Favor. 
119. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Argument Against (discussing possible 
effects ofCCRI on outreach, mentoring, and tutoring programs). 
120. Id. 
121. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Analysis by the Legislative Analyst. 
122. See generally CAL. EDUC. CODE § 42245-49 (West 1999). 
123. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Analysis by the Legislative Analyst. 
124. Id. 
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If one considers the broader context of the election debate, vol-
untary desegregation appears as a virtual non-issue. Indeed, aLEXIS 
search about the ccru campaign turned up only a handful of news sto-
ries that connected the initiative with desegregation programs. One 
such account revealed that the pro-ccru campaign staff itself was 
taken by surprise with suggestions that the initiative might have ramifi-
cations in this area. 125 
The absence of desegregation as an issue during the Proposition 
209 debate may be contrasted with an earlier initiative, Proposition I. It 
dealt exclusively with desegregation. The specific intent of the voters to 
preserve voluntary desegregation expressed in that initiative arguably 
should weigh heavily against the virtual silence on the topic in Propo-
sition 209's legislative history. 126 
Finally, for what it is worth, the contemporaneous construction of 
Proposition 209 by government officials also tends to support the view 
that ccru does not apply to voluntary desegregation. To be sure, in the 
immediate aftermath of the election, the superintendent of California's 
public school system, relying on the Legislative Analyst's report, in-
cluded voluntary integration on a list of programs that "could easily be 
invalidated" under Proposition 209.127 Unlike the Legislative Analyst's 
report, the superintendent's list did not distinguish between types of 
desegregation programs. 128 Moreover, her use of the conditional tense 
hardly bespeaks a definitive construction of Proposition 209. 
By contrast, California's Attorney General has taken the position 
that busing and race-based student assignments do not violate section 
125. See Nanette Asimov, Prop. 209 Gives Special-Funding Schools the Jitters: 
Money for Integration Could Be Lost, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 29, 1996, at All; cf Jan Fer-
ris, Initiative Has Some Services in Limbo, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 28, 1996, at Bl 
("Public elementary and high schools weren't the intended targets of Proposition 209"); 
Sandra Hernandez, Collateral Damage: CCRl's Impact Will Reach a Lot More Than 
Affirmative Action, L.A. WEEKLY, Nov. 1, 1996, at p.34. 
126. See infra note 128. 
127. See Letter to Gov. Wilson from Delaine Eastin, State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, Nov. 26, 1996. The letter responded to the governor's Executive Order 
requesting all public agencies to identify programs likely to be affected by Proposition 
209. As such, it might constitute an official finding by the relevant administrative 
agency to which the courts owe some degree of deference. But for reasons already 
stated, this fiction hardly seems worth indulging in the case of a constitutional amend-
ment such as Proposition 209, and in any case, the letter contained a laundry list of 
likely suspects without any real substantive analysis. Similarly, little significance 
should be placed on the informal, pre-election comments by Joseph Symkowick, the 
Education Department's general counsel. See supra note 22. 
128. See id. 
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31. 129 In any case, no action has been taken at the state or local level to 
curtail any of these programs in response to CCRI. 130 The State Assem-
bly has also continued to appropriate funding for voluntary school de-
segregation, thereby implicitly validating the status quO. 131 
V. DOES BUSING DOE DISCRIMINATE? 
Most textual analysis of Proposition 209 has focused on the 
phrase "grant preferential treatment" as presenting the principal inter-
pretive challenge, with the preceding term "discriminate against" as-
sumed merely to reaffirm existing law. 132 Similarly, the debate before 
the election centered on the prospective ban on preferential treatment, 
with supporters and opponents both assuming that this phrase provided 
the cutting edge of CCRI's assault on existing law.133 The Legislative 
Analysts's appraisal of Proposition 209 did not even discuss the anti-
discrimination aspect of clause (a), and focused exclusively on possible 
interpretations of preferential treatment, the final determination of 
which, the Analyst cautioned, would r~quire a judicial ruling. 134 
Before investigating the latter term, it makes sense to pause for a 
moment and consider the meaning of "discriminate" as used in section 
31. Some precision in this respect is necessary because, if nothing else, 
129. See Volokh, supra note II, at 1344 n.27 (during the litigation over Proposition 
209's constitutionality). 
130. See Ruiz, supra note 21. 
131. See Board of Educ. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 567 (Ct. App. 
1998). Indeed, the legislature has shown an active interest in voluntary desegregation 
by enacting several changes to statewide policies in this area. [d.; See Walrath, supra 
note 28. 
132. See Gotanda, supra note 11, at 17 (stating that while discrimination has a sub-
stantial legal history, "preferential treatment" creates an apparently novel cause of 
action); see also Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1488 (N.D. 
Cal. 1996) (stating "much of this language simply reaffirms existing anti-discrimination 
protections .... "). 
133. See Ken Chavez, Language Takes Central Role in Fight Over CCRI, SAC-
RAMENTO BEE, June 2, 1996, at AI. There was some muddying of the water on the part 
of the pro-209 forces by their campaign mantra that "preferences for some means dis-
crimination against others." Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104 at Argument Against. 
This syllogism, if taken literally, would render the initiative meaningless since dis-
crimination is, of course, already prohibited. As discussed below, the use of discrimi-
nation in this sense should taken more as a rhetorical device, than legal definition. See 
infra note 181. 
134. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104 at Analysis by Legislative Analyst. 
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the meaning of preference explored below will be defined, in part, with 
respect to existing discrimination standards. 135 
To be sure, discrimination has an established pedigree as a legal 
term. As such, a court could indulge its "irresistible presumption" that 
voters Considered the term against a backdrop of existing legal mean-
ing. 136 Nothing appeared in the campaign for Proposition 209 that 
would contradict this . established presumption. Yet, this begs the ques-
tion: which meaning? Discrimination is a protean term appearing in a 
wide array of legal contexts whose doctrinal contours are by no means 
homologous. 137 By specifying the bases according to which discrimi-
nation is prohibited-race, gender, ethnicity, etc.-section 31 clearly 
aims to prevent these categories from factoring into government poli-
cies. Yet, the enforcement of such a prohibition would vary according 
to the specific model of discrimination being implemented.138 Which 
model did the voters intend?139 
Given that Proposition 209 represents an amendment to the Cali-
fornia Constitution, the normal presumption would be to interpret dis-
crimination by reference to its constitutional meaning. 140 Variants of 
the word "discriminate" that appear in the text of the California Con-
135 .. See infra Parts V-A, V-E, & VI-B. 
136. See Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 646 (Cal. 1994). 
137. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978) (Powell, 1., 
opinion) (noting that "the concept of discrimination ... is susceptible of varying inter-
pretations."). /d. 
138. One might also ask at what level of meaning discrimination is to be policed. 
Depending on the context, discrimination can refer to a facial classification, a discrimi-
natory purpose, or even a discriminatory effect. Some commentators have also sug-
gested a fourth level on which discrimination can be assessed, which is social meaning. 
See, e.g., Charles Lawrence, III, The ld, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317,350,355-58 (1987). 
139. See Volokh, supra note 11, at 1341. Volokh quotes Supreme Court language 
from a Title VII case that asks, "whether a program 'treats a person in a manner which 
but for that person's sex [, race, color, ethnicity, or national origin] would be differ-
ent.'" ld. (quoting City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 
702, 711 (1978)). Prof. Volokh, however, does not explain why voters necessarily had 
Title VII in mind as the model for discrimination in CCRI. There are also reasons to 
suspect that his simple test may in fact be simplistic. For one thing, the test only fo-
cuses on disparate treatment, and ignores the issue of intent. To be liable for disparate 
treatment, one must specifically intend to treat people differently based on their group 
status. By contrast, under a theory of disparate impact, group status-e.g. sex or race-
does not necessarily serve as but-for causes resulting in different treatment, but rather 
merely needs to show a statistical correlation with unequal outcomes. Volokh does not 
address these considerations. 
140. As noted above, language used within a single body of law is ordinarily assumed 
to have a common meaning. See Sutro, supra note 58. 
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stitution in two places, neither of which is particularly relevant to 
CCRI. 141 When one considers the term's usage in case law interpreting 
the California Constitution, however, discrimination has a much wider 
. ·d 142 
mCI ent. 
The constitutional usage of discrimination most apropos to CCRI 
would seem to bl:? that associated with the California equal protection 
clause of article I, section 7. This is the most prominent constitutional 
provision governing discrimination based on the sort of immutable 
characteristics-race, gender, etc.-specified in Proposition 209.143 
Moreover, the latter inserts its new section 31 into the same article as 
section 7, reinforcing the presumption of a shared meaning. l44 Al-
though the word discrimination appears nowhere in the text of section 
7, the equal protection clause, which section 7 does contain, is com-
monly associated with discrimination case law. 145 Indeed, one might 
141. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8 (guarantying "free exercise and enjoyment of religion 
without discrimination or preference."). [d.; CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 4 (authorizing a 
transport commission to "prohibit discrimination ... or discriminatory charges.") [d. 
These provisions apply to very different bases for discrimination (e.g., worship or tar-
iffs) than the status categories governed by CCRI and thus would not seem likely can-
didates for an interpretive model. Section 4 of Article I, however, deserves add,tional 
attention because it combines the words "discrimination" and "preference" in an exist-
ing constitutional provision. This aspect of the section 4 will be considered later in the 
context of preferences. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
142. A LEXIS search of the California Constitution turned up 30 different areas in 
which some variant of the word discriminate appeared in the annotations of a constitu-
tional provision. 
143. CAL. CONST. art. § 7. art:I, § 8 also addresses employment discrimination based 
on a similar list of specified protected categories. See id at § 8. With the emergence of 
modem equal protection doctrine, however, section 8 has become a relatively little-
used provision. The 1983 version of West's Annotated California Code devotes only 
three pages to section 8 cases-with none in the 1998 supplement. By contrast, the 
equal protection clause of section 7 accounts for 70 pages of casenotes, plus 24 pages 
of recent cases provided in the supplement. One might consider the former to be sub-
sumed by the latter, and indeed some section 8 cases today explicitly refer to "equal 
protection." See, e.g., Hardy v. Stumpf, 576 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Cal. 1978). 
144. See Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 576-77 (Cal. 1995) (Mosk, J., dissenting) 
(statutory language common to a single body of law is presumed to have identical 
meaning). . 
145. See, e.g., Salazar v. Eastin, 890 P.2d 43, 46 (Cal. 1995) (plaintiff claimed that 
charge for transportation violated equal protection .... "); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 
892 P.2d 1145, 1176 (Cal. 1995) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (asserting that an ordinance that 
intentionally discriminates violates the equal protection clause). 
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. say that the paradigmatic meaning of discrimination in constitutional 
. h d ·al f al . 146 contexts IS teem 0 equ protectlOn. 
The ballot pamphlet's Argument in Favor underscored this con-
nection when it stated that approval of CCRI would "bring us together 
under a single standard of equal treatment of the law.,,147 To the extent 
therefore that voters thought of Proposition 209 as reaffirming existing 
law based on the California Constitution, they would likely have 
thought of discrimination in equal protection terms. 148 As such, a court 
adopting a constitutional model would most likely read discrimination 
in section 31 as coextensive with California equal protection case law. 
If so, that application to voluntary desegregation programs such as 
busing would be unambiguous. As noted, the California Constitution 
specifies that voluntary desegregation remains permitted under its 
amended state equal protection provisions. 149 This means that, by defi-
nition, such programs do not constitute discrimination. 
It is possible, of course, that the discrimination ban in section 31 
might incorporate standards taken from sources outside the California 
Constitution. The absence of debate over this provision seems to argue 
against an interpretive approach premised on such a fundamental revi-
sion to California law. 150 Nonetheless, a case could be made that dis-
crimination in CCRI should be interpreted by reference to the 1964 
Civil Rights Act. The ballot pamphlet Argument in Favor informed 
146. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 467 (6th ed. 1990) (defining discrimination in 
constitutional law using equal protection terms). This association applies equally to 
state and federal equal protection jurisprudence, as California courts have construed the 
former as "substantially the equivalent" of the latter; See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 
1241,1249 n.ll (Cal. 1971). 
147. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Argument in Favor. 
148. The additional antidiscrimination language of section 31 would not be redun-
dant, even if read as a reaffirmation of equal protection case law, because it codifies 
explicit bases for heightened scrutiny which section 7 does not. 
149. CAL. CON ST. art. I, § 7, c1. (a) (stating that "nothing herein shall prohibit the 
governing board of a· school district from voluntarily continuing or commencing a 
school integration plan .... "). /d. Although this language was inserted by a constitu-
tional initiative, nothing on the face of the disclaimer is restricted to that specific 
amendment. Constitutional provisions are to be read as a seamless whole. According to 
its ordinary and usual meaning, "nothing herein" therefore encompasses the entire 
section. 
150. Revising the applicable standards governing constitutional discrimination would 
have far wider implications than the repeal of affirmative action on which the CCRI 
campaign focused. Yet, as mentioned, the main debate during the campaign centered on 
the meaning of Proposition 209's prohibition of preferential treatment, with discrimi-
nation assumed to be merely duplicative of existing standards. 
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voters that Proposition 209 "restates this historic act,,,151 and the Re-
buttal to Argument Against further reinforced this association between 
the initiative and the 1964 Act. 152 From this, one might infer that the 
key terms of section 31 derive their meaning from that federal statutory 
source. 153 
Linking CCRI to the Civil Rights Act hardly resolves the ambi-
guities in the meaning of discrimination, however, because the inter-
pretation given of term varies within the Act itself. Under Title VI, 
discrimination is read as coterminous with the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.154 Discrimination in Title Vll, however, 
has been read as both narrowerl55 and broaderl56 than its meaning in the 
federal constitution. Meanwhile, the circuits are split as to which of 
these doctrinal models Title IX should follow. 157 
Given this uncertainty, a court would likely think twice before 
continuing down this interpretive path. 158 In any case, there is no reason 
151. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Argument in Favor. 
152. The Rebuttal described the initiative as "us[ing] the legally-tested language of 
the original 1964 Civil Rights Act." It added that "[a]nyone opposed to Proposition 209 
is opposed to the 1964 Civil Rights Act." See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Re-
buttal to Argument Against. 
153. One might also consider additional hints dropped in the ballot arguments. The 
Argument in Favor makes the promise to voters that "Proposition 209 keeps in place all 
... state protections against discrimination." See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at 
Argument in Favor. However, this only means that Proposition 209 does not overrule 
existing antidiscrimination provisions, not that it does not introduce additional, sup-
plementary standards. See Ballot Argument, supra note 1 04, at Rebuttal to Argument 
Against. Proposition 209 appears to confirm that latter possibility when it states that 
"Proposition 209 adds NEW PROTECTION against sex discrimination on top of ex-
isting ones." [d. The Rebuttal does not clarify whether these new protections inhere in 
the discrimination prong of section 31, however, as opposed to its concededly novel 
anti-preference language. [d. 
154. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732 n.6 (1992). 
155. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628-29 (1987). 
156. Compare Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (Equal 
Protection Clause does not reach effects alone), with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (Title VII reaches disparate impacts). 
157. Compare Roberts v. Colorado State Bd., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (lOth Cir. 1993) 
(Title IX follows Title VII's model) with Cannon v. University of Chicago, 648 F.2d 
1104,1107-08 (7th Cir. 1981) (Title IX coextensive with constitution). 
158. In essence, there are two models of discrimination represented in the 1965 Act: 
Title VII standards and those of federal equal protection. Choosing between these two 
variant models would present a dilemma. On the basis of textual evidence, Title VII 
would appear to be the statutory source, which, as the ballot argument promises, ccru 
"restates." See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Argument in Favor. The language of 
section 31(a) generally appears to track Title VII more closely than other portions of 
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to suspect the outcome would be any different under a discrimination 
standard based on either Title VII or federal equal protection. Volun-
tary desegregation programs are already subject to federal constitu-
tional standards, and yet have rarely been challenged in court, let alone 
overtumed.159 The statutory anti-discrimination language of Title VII is 
generally thought to be narrower than its equal protection equivalent in 
this regard; 160 therefore, busing would likely pass muster under a Title 
VII model as well. 
the Act. Compare CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31, cl. (a) ("state shall not discriminate 
against"), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(~)(1) (1999) (Title VII) ("unlawful [to] ... dis-
criminate against"), with 42 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1999) (Title IX) ("no person ... shall .. 
. be subjected to discrimination"), and with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI) (same). In 
addition, one can match the other term of prohibition in section 31 (a), "grant preferen-
tial treatment" with identical language to Title VII. See supra notes 89 & 104 and ac-
companying text. Similarly, the wording of the exception for bona fide accommoda-
tions based on sex in section 31 (c) almost certainly comes from Title VII. Compare 
CAL CONST. art. I, § 31, cl.(c) with 42 U.S.C. sect. 2000e-2(e)(1); See Volokh, supra 
note 11, at 1364. On the other hand, one would hesitate on prudential grounds before 
importing the statutory model of Title VII whose doctrinal tests are specific to the 
employment context into the far broader horizons of a constitutional context. Instead, 
adopting the federal constitutional model of Title VI would minimize the potential for 
far-reaching (and unintended) jurisprudential effects. As noted, the lack of debate over 
this aspect of CCR! represents evidence from the electoral context that no such changes 
were intended in the meaning of discrimination. Perhaps for this reason, the courts that 
have addressed CCR! thus far have analyzed its language in equal protection terms. See 
Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. San Jose, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 896 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(relying on federal equal protection precedents to resolve a claim under section 31); 
Wilson v. State Personnel Bd., No.96CSOI082, (Cal. Supp. Ct., Dept. 33, Nov. 30, 
1998) (noting that "Proposition 209 appears to mirror federal and state equal protection 
guarantees"). 
159. Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on voluntary desegregation di-
rectly, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court 
stated that race-conscious school assignments designed to promote integration lie 
"within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities." [d. at 16. This dictum 
had the backing of an unanimous Supreme Court and has never been contradicted. Cf 
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 472 n.15 (1982) (declining to pass on 
the issue and citing Swann). Most lower courts have accepted the goal of fostering 
integration as sufficient to pass equal protection scrutiny. See Johnson v. Board of 
Educ., 604 F.2d 504, 518 (7th Cir. 1979), vacating as moot 449 U.S. 915 (1980); Parent 
Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 720 (2d Cir. 1979); 
Bolin v. San Bernardino Unified Sch. Dist., 202 Cal. Rptr. 416, 420 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(facuIty integration plan); Olson v. Board of Educ., 250 F. Supp. 1000, 1010 (E.D.N.Y. 
1966). But see Equal Open Enrollment Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 937 F. Supp. 700 
(N.D. Ohio 1996) (rejecting claim of remedial purpose as unsupported). 
160. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628; Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 
F.3d 344, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Shuford v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 897 F. Supp. 
1535, 1568 (M.D. Ala. 1995) ("[S]trict scrutiny is more demanding than the Title VII 
standard .... "). [d. 
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VI. THE MEANING OF PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
Unlike discrimination, "preferential treatment" does not have 
much of a track record. Pre-election analysis of this untested phrase 
yielded widely varying interpretations of its likely meaning. 161 In the 
Ballot Pamphlet, both the proponents of Proposition 209 and the Leg-
islative Analyst used variants such as "preference" and "prefer" inter-
changeably with "preferential treatment.,,162 Yet, even if one considers 
these closely related terms, the picture does not improve much. Al-
though "preference" does appear elsewhere in the California Constitu-
tion, the contexts differ from that of CCRI.163 A consistent pattern of 
similar terminology does not appear elsewhere in existing law that is 
relevant to a civil rights initiative. l64 
161. Compare Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity and 
the California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135, 1147 (1996) 
(ethnic studies programs constitute preferential treatment), with National Association of 
Women Business Owner: An Open Letter to Governor Pete Wilson (preferences are 
already illegal). 
162. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Argument in Favor & Analysis of Leg-
islative Analyst, passim; cf Lucas Valley Homeowners Ass'n, v. County of Marin, 284 
Cal. Rptr. 427, 433-34 (Ct. App. 1991) (equating preferences with preferential treat-
ment as used in another provision ofthe California Constitution). 
163. Article VII of the California Constitution states that the "Legislature may pro-
vide preferences for veterans .... " CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 6, cl. (a). Article X(a) al-
lows the courts to give docket preference to certain kinds of cases. See id. at art. X(a), § 
6, cls. (c) & (d). Neither provision has been extensively interpreted in the courts. 
The only usage of preference relevant to civil rights appears in Article'I, section 4, the 
same article, which contains section 31. Section 4 guarantees the "free exercise and 
enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference." Id. at art. I, § 4. As noted 
in Part Ill, the analogy between a preference with respect to "free exercise" (an activ-
ity) versus preferential treatment on the basis of an immutable characteristic (e.g., race) 
appears less than exact. See supra note 92. Therefore, one would hesitate assuming that 
preference in section 31 takes its meaning from section 4. Nor is there any indication 
that this correspondence of terminology was considered, or even known of, before the 
election. By contrast, the identification of CCRI's preference ban with an end to af-
firmative action formed the crux of the 209 debate. Therefore, it makes sense to con-
sider the meaning of preferential treatment in the context of affirmative action first, and 
look to the usage of similar language in section 4 oply as a secondary source of guid-
ance. Section 4 merits additional interest, though, because it contains both discrimina-
tion and preference in the same clause. The relationship between these terms suggested 
by section 4 in the context of remedies will be considered further in subpart E. 
164. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (6th ed. 1990) (providing technical 
definitions for preferences in bankruptcy and securities context, but no civil rights 
and/or generic legal meaning for these terms). Prof. Volokh appears to contend other-
wise. By offering a long list of statutory citations where the words "preference" or 
"preferential" appear-usually accompanying other related terms-he suggests prefer-
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A. PREFERENCES OCCUpy A LoOPHOLE IN DISCRIMINATION LA w 
One place where preferential treatment does appear to have 
somewhat of an established contextual meaning is in affirmative action 
case law. 165 As Professor Volokh has noted, various forms of the word 
"preference" crop up throughout the United States Supreme Court's 
decisions in this area. 166 Since Proposition 209 was presented as a ref-
erendum on affirmative action, the usage of such language in this con-
text would seem highly pertinent. 
In general, the United States Supreme Court uses the term "pref-
erence" in its affirmative action cases in accordance with its every day 
meaning of favoring or conferring advantage. 167 It, however, is instruc-
tive to analyze the precise nature of the preferences at stake in these 
cases. Without exception, the affirmative action preferences to which 
the Court referred involved formal, deliberate decision-making policies 
which on their face explicitly favored applicants from certain preferred 
racial or gender groups over others from non-preferred groups in a 
competition for a scarce resource. 168 
ence has an established meaning in antidiscrimination law. See Volokh, supra note II, 
at 1342 n.18. Yet, he does not cite any cases in which such language is given a distinct 
and authoritative construction. Thus, there is no reason to conclude that preferential 
treatment represents a term of art any of these contexts, let alone one that can be linked 
to Proposition 209. 
165. This is not to say that "preferential treatment" is used as a term of art in these 
cases; the meaning of preference remains implicit. Nonetheless, there is evidence that 
the drafters of Proposition 209 considered the phrase as such, and pointed to these cases 
as the defining context. To the extent that their views were communicated to the voting 
public, a stronger case can be made that this context should control the interpretation 
that the initiative receives. See Volokh, supra note II, at 1341. 
166. See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989); Regents of Univ. of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 301, 328 (1978); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 
312,332 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Volokh, supra note II,at 1342 n.19 
& 1343 n.24 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 219 (1995». A 
similar pattern of usage crops up in affirmative action cases brought under state law in 
California. See, e.g., Price v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 604 P.2d 1365, 1383 (Cal. 1980); 
Minnick V. California Dep't of Corrections, 157 Cal. Rptr. 260, 266 n.5 (Ct. App. 
1979); Dawn V. State Personnel Bd., 154 Cal. Rptr. 186, 189 n.4 (Ct. App. 1979). 
167. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1787 (3d ed. 1976). 
168. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 217-21 (preference to minority contractors' bids); 
Metro Broadcasting V. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 548 (1990) (preference for minority-
ownership in broadcast licensing auction decisions); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94; John-
son V. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 656 (1987) 
(gender preference for employment promotions); Fullilove V. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 
450 (1980); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 304 (preference in university admissions for minori-
ties); United Steelworkers of America V. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (quota for mi-
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Normally, SQch facially discriminatory practices would violate the 
anti-discrimination provisions of existing law. The United States Su-
preme Court, however, has upheld the use of preferential racial classifi-
cations under certain narrow conditions in a series of equal protection 
and Title VII cases. 169 In the case of equal protection, the doctrinal 
mechanism defining the contours of these narrow conditions is strict 
scrutiny.170 "Suspect classifications," such as the use of race in af-
firmative action, are subject to strict scrutiny and only survive if they 
can demonstrate a compelling purpose and a narrowly tailored scope. l7l 
In the case of Title VII, there is no formal equivalent of strict scrutiny. 
The Court, however, has read the statutory definition of discrimination 
contained in Title VII to harbor a similar exception for "bona fide af-
fi . . I ,,172 lrmatlve actlon pans. 
Therefore, in both equal protection and Title VII, existing legal 
standards of discrimination fall short of an absolute bar on suspect clas-
sifications. Affirmative action preferences, while prima facie discrimi-
natory, benefited from this loophole in existing law. Since the intent of 
Proposition 209 was to end such affirmative action practices, one can 
understand its ban on preferential treatment to create anew, absolute 
nority hiring); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. at 332 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (prefer-
ence in university admissions for minorities). 
169. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (narrowly-tailored preference to remedy pat-
tern of discrimination consistent with equal protection); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 (Pow-
ell, J., opinion) (finding admissions preference to promote diversity constitutional); id. 
at 326 n.l (Powell, 1:, opinion joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, & Black-
mun who agreed with Justice Powell, subject to proviso of remedial purpose); Weber, 
443 U.S. at 207 (bona fide affirmative action plan permitted under Title VII). 
170. This methodology is common to both state and federal equal protection. See 
People v. Applin, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862,864 (Ct. App. 1995). 
171. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 216. Equal protection scrutiny generally applies 
to classifications stated in rules, in which case the nature of the classification is appar-
ent on the face of the rule. However, similar principles can be applied in the case of an 
action taken without a specific rule. To do so requires a determination of intent. Gov-
ernment actions are assumed to have reasons. Such reasons may be stated as general 
rules. If these rules involve a suspect classification, then strict scrutiny applies. Cf 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to redistricting 
plan unduly influenced by racial considerations). 
172. Weber, 443 U.S. at 202. The Court did not define what qualifies as "bona fide" 
under this loophole. However, the criteria that the Court pointed to bear a strong re-
semblance to the requirements of strict scrutiny applicable to affirmative action cases 
brought under the equal protection clause: i.e., remedial purpose, limited, flexible 
scope, lack of undue burden on non-preferred groups, and temporary duration. Cf 
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149,167,177-82 (1987) (applying strict scrutiny to 
an affirmative action consent decree). . 
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standard, which at minimum outlaws those types of preferential poli-
cies used in the affirmative action cases, regardless of their justifica-
tion. 173 Suspect classifications based on such preferences would thus be 
ruled out preemptively before even reaching strict scrutiny or its Title 
VII equivalent. 174 
B. BANNING PREFERENCES DOES NOT EUMINATE ALL USES OF RACE 
The question as-yet-unanswered is whether section 31 goes fur-
ther than this. Instead of merely narrowing the gap between discrimi-
nation and classification sufficiently to eliminate preferences, does sec-
tion 31 somehow also impose a per se prohibition on racial classifica-
tions of any kind? In other words, instead of precluding the use of race 
in a preferential manner, does it outlaw the use of race in and of itself? 
In his interpretive analysis of Proposition 209, Professor Volokh 
comes close to making this claim. He begins by positing a "simple test" 
for discrimination as "treat[ing] a person in a manner which, but for 
that person's sex, race, color, ethnicity, or national origin," would be 
different. 175 He then observes that in Weber, the Supreme Court 
"carved out an exception [from this test] for certain preferential treat-
ment programs.,,176 In Weber, the Court upheld an affirmative action 
plan that involved preferential hiring of minorities against a challenge 
under Title VII.177 Although Title VII's statutory prohibition on dis-
173. Cf Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1489 (N.D. 
Cal. 1996) ("[TJhe primary change Proposition 209 makes to existing law is to close 
that narrow but significant window that permits [ J governmental race- and gender-
conscious affirmative action programs ... under the United States Constitution .... "). 
Id. 
174. Cf Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885 
(1999) (noting that parties in that case agreed that section 31 precludes programs that 
discriminate or give preference even if there is a compelling government interest). 
175. Volokh, supra note 11, at 1342 (quoting City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,711 (1978». Volokh's test comes from language in a 
Supreme Court opinion examining gender discrimination under Title VII. See Manhart, 
435 U.S. at 710. However, there are reasons to suspect that the "any difference" stan-
dard of discrimination suggested by this formulation is overbroad. In the context of 
gender, at least, there is a whole line of cases which differential treatment did not give 
rise to a Title VII claim. See supra note 158. A more careful reading of Title VII indi-
cates that discrimination requires actual disadvantage, not mere differentiation. See 
supra note 158. Dicta aside, Volokh does not cite any cases with facts to the contrary. 
176. Volokh, supra note II, at 1342. 
177. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209. Weber dealt with an affirmative action plan in the pri-
vate sector. See id. at 197. The Supreme Court later offered a rehashing of the same 
arguments applied to the public sector in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa 
Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616,626-27 (1987). 
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crimination by race appeared to make no exceptions for affirmative 
action plans, the Court managed to circumvent this literal reading of the 
statute. It did so, in part, by reference to an accompanying provision of 
the statute: Section 7030) of Title VII states that "nothing contained in 
this subchapter shall ... require any employer ... to grant preferential 
treatment .... ,,178 The Court reasoned that, by emphasizing that prefer-
ential treatment was not to be required, Congress thereby signaled its 
intent that preferential treatment would nonetheless remain permitted 
on a voluntary basis. Therefore, it ruled that affIrmative action prefer-
ences need not be found discriminatory under Title VII. 179 
Reading Proposition 209 against this context, Volokh argues that 
"CCRI explicitly says what the Weber Court thought Title VII didn't 
say: Preferential treatment is not permitted.,,180 
Volokh's account convincingly demonstrates how section 31(a)'s 
language serves to close the particular loophole recognized in Weber. 
Professor Volokh, however, does not explain how the textual formula-
tion adopted to make that change applies to racial classifIcations gener-
ally.181 
178. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(j) (1991). 
179. Weber, 443 U.S. at 205. 
180. Volokh, supra note 11, at 1343. 
181. Prof. Volokh attempts to finesse this point by arguing that preferential treatment 
is understood to have the same scope of meaning as discrimination (which under his 
"any difference" standard would be coextensive with racial classification). See id. at 
1341 (arguing that "'preferential treatment' is just the other side of the discrimination 
coin"). While Volokh, of course, is correct that the two terms have roughly reciprocal 
meanings, this hardly means they are mirror-images, as his argument req~ires. (Nor 
does he explain why the drafters of CCRI would create such an entirely redundant 
construction). To defend his premise, Volokh offers two long string cites purporting to 
demonstrate "the sense in which 'preferential treatment' is used in other antidiscrimi-
nation laws and in discrimination cases." [d. at 1342 nn.18 & 19. The first footnote, 
covering "laws," is mostly statutory; it merely reveals that discrimination and prefer-
ences often appear together amidst a list of prohibitory terms. See id. at 1342 n.18. This 
suggests the words have complementary or overlapping meanings, but not identical 
ones. In addition, the footnote cites article I, section 8 of the California Constitution, 
the only place in that document besides section 31 in which preference and discrimina-
tion appear together. Yet, far from endorsing Volokh's posited symmetry of meaning, 
in fact the California Supreme Court has interpreted these terms as having an asymmet-
ric relationship, noting that "[p 1 reference ... is forbidden even when there is no dis-
crimination." Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663, 665 (Cal. 1978). The second 
footnote refers to the affirmative action cases already discussed above. See Volokh, 
supra note 11, at 1342 n.19 and accompanying text. The Court's references to prefer-
ences there hardly support Volokh's reading of the term as synonymous with race-
consciousness generally. 
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This gap in Volokh's argument is troubling because his reading of 
preferences as embracing racial classifications of all kinds appears 
broader than its plain meaning will support. Webster's Dictionary de-
fines preferential treatment as "offering or constituting an 
advantage,,,182 while classifications include any "systematic division 
into classes or groups,,,183 whether advantageous or not. Of course, in 
certain circumstances, courts· may presume that voters understood legal 
terms according to a specialized, technical meaning established in case 
law. However, there is little reason to believe that this rule would apply 
here. 184 
Concededly, by forbidding the state to "grant preferential treat-
ment," CCRI echoes the words of section 703G) verbatim. 185 By 
choosing to insert that exact phrase as a term of prohibition in the ini-
tiative, the authors may well have considered that they were using it as 
a term of art established in Title VII case law. 186 Even if one is willing 
to impute this conceit of the drafters onto the voters who actually ap-
proved Proposition 209,187 there is still little reason to conclude that the 
United States Supreme Court's "specialized" usage of the term in cases 
such as Weber justifies a broader construction of the term than its plain 
meaning. The Weber Court was confronted with a quota-hiring scheme 
that explicitly preferred black employees. In discussing the application 
of Title VII to those facts, the Court gave no indication that it under-
stood the phrase "preferential treatment" to encompass anything be-
yond the facially preferential policies then at issue. 188 Throughout its 
analysis, the Court speaks of "race-conscious affirmative action," but 
182. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1787. 
183. [d. at 417. 
184. Cf Creighton v. City of Santa Monica, 207 Cal. Rptr. 78, 82-83 (Ct. App. 1984) 
("[W]ords must be understood ... as the words of the voters ... in the common popu-
lar way, and in the absence of some strong and convincing reason ... they are not 
entitled to be considered in a technical sense inconsistent with their popular mean-
ing .... ") [d. 
185. The only other place in the United States Code this phrase appears is in Title IX 
of the same statute. See 42 U.S.C. § l681(b) (stating that "preferential or disparate 
treatment" is not required). 
186. The authors of Proposition 209 were familiar with the usage of preferences in 
the affirmative action cases and gave the specific example of the Court's manipulation 
of section 703(j)' s preferential treatment clause to support its required/permitted dis-
tinction. See Chavez, supra note 133 (referring obliquely to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion to Johnson-the companion case to Weber). 
187. Cf Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 564 n.7 (Cal. 1995) ("[T]he intent of the 
drafters may be considered by the court [only] if there is reason to believe that the 
electorate was aware of that intent.") 
188. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,205 (1979). 
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nowhere does it identify preferences with race-conscious policies of 
any other kind. 189 
The idea that preferential treatment entails more than mere neutral 
classification is reinforced by the ballot Argument in Favor, the con-
cluding lines of which exhorted readers to "vote for FAIRNESS ... not 
favoritism! Reject preferences .... ,,190 Indeed, throughout the cam-
paign, CCRI proponents gained considerable rhetorical advantage by 
attacking preferences as synonymous with favoritism. Instead of argu-
ing for the eradication of race-consciousness from government policies 
as a matter of abstract principle, the moral force of the pro-209 case 
thus rested on the far more emotive issue of fairness in the allocation of 
government benefits. 191 
Had the drafters of Proposition 209 really intended to raise a con-
stitutional bar to all government action involving race, they could have 
done so in a far more straight-forward manner. Instead of prohibiting 
just preferential treatment based on race, they could have written the 
initiative explicitly to bar all racial classifications. 192 Instead, they 
chose to restrict the wording of the ballot measure to a narrower for-
mulation and waged a campaign focusing on racial favoritism, instead 
of race per se. One is left with the suspicion that a differently worded 
initiative with broader implications might not have attracted the votes 
to pass. 
189. See id. 
190. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Argument in Favor. Similarly, in the 
religious context, the California Supreme Court has interpreted an equivalent prohibi-
tion on preference as applying to any "benefit [granted] to a religion or religion in 
general that is not granted to society at large." See Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. 
Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 840 (Cal. 1991). However, where the state merely accords differ-
ent, but equivalent treatment to religions and non-religions, this has not been deemed 
preferential. See Okrand v. City of Los Angeles, 254 Cal. Rptr. 913, 917-18 (Ct. App. 
1989) (display of menorah and Christmas tree as cultural artifacts not unconstitutional 
preference). 
191. Cf Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Argument in Favor ("Government ... 
must not give ajob, a university admission, or a contract based on race or sex"). 
192. Furthermore, if one accepts Volokh's argument that the ban on preferential 
treatment actually covers all racial classifications, one might wonder why it was that 
the drafters included a parallel ban on discrimination, whose scope, by Volokh's defi-
nition, would seem to be entirely subsumed within the meaning of this new preference 
ban. Volokh does not address this apparent redundancy. However, the pairing of this 
new term with an old one suggests that the new provision was intended to supersede 
only a portion of the old, namely that which involves preferential classifications. 
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C. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT MAY BE LIMITED TO COMPETITIVE 
SETTINGS 
J 
Having concluded that preferential treatment in section 31 retains 
its literal meaning of conferring advantage, the contours of the advan-
tage or favoritism remain to be clarified, which the prohibition on pref-
erences addresses. As a starting point, it is useful to recall the nature of 
the preferences in the affIrmative action cases, which were the primary 
target of CCRI. These involved policies explicitly favoring applicants 
from certain preferred racial or gender groups over others from non-
~ d . .. ~ 193 prelerre groups In a competItIon lor a scarce resource. 
There is some basis for concluding that preferential treatment 
should be construed only to encompass advantages conferred in similar 
competitive contexts. The dictionary definitions of preference have the 
. f f . h 194 L 1 . connotatIOn 0 avonng one party over anot er. ega contexts In 
which the terminology of preferences is used--e.g. preferential voting, 
preferential tariffs, preferences among creditors, preferred stock-
similarly suggest favoritism in the allocation of a scarce resource.195 If 
these connotations hold, it would push the meaning of preferential 
treatment in section 31 to something closer to the narrow zero-sum 
context to which the Ninth Circuit read it as being confined. 196 
The rhetoric used in the Argument in Favor lends support to this 
gloss on preference. The Argument in Favor refers to restoring fairness 
in competition, by dismantling preferential policies. 197 It speaks of the 
193. See supra note 181. See also Minnick v. Department of Corrections, 157 Cal. 
Rptr. 260, 266 n.5 (Ct. App. 1979) ("[P]references [in affirmative action plan] result in 
favor of certain ethnic groups ... to the detriment of the other[s] .... "). Id. 
194. Webster's definition of preference includes "choice or estimation above an-
other." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1787 (3d ed. 1976). American 
Heritage's definition has it as "the selecting of someone or something over another or 
others." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1033 (1996). 
195. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 467 (6th ed. 1990) (defining preference as 
"[p]rioirty of payment given to one or more creditors."). 
196. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco Unif. Sch. Dist., 616 F.2d 
1381, 1388 (9th Cir. 1908). Of course, if one adopts a Social Darwinian view, ulti-
mately every benefit or burden has competitive consequences at some level, and every 
resource is scarce in strict economic terms. For this same reason, the division between 
zero-sum and non-zero-sum is hard to sustain under any rigorous definition. These 
terms exist along a continuum of meaning. Any distinction must rest on a subjective 
evaluation of baseline norms and shared interests. Just because the boundaries are 
fuzzy, however, does not mean the underlying differences are rendered meaningless. 
197. The Argument in Favor mentions the word 'compete' twice: speaking of 
"provid[ing] the tools to compete in our society" and removing "the myth that 'minori-
ties' and women cannot compete without special preferences." See Ballot Pamphlet, 
supra note 104, at Argument in Favor. 
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necessity to "judge all people equally," instead of preferring the "less 
qualified.,,198 As noted, preferences administered in affirmative action 
programs-the focus of the Argument in Favor-clearly involve com-
petitive settings. Moreover, throughout the campaign, Proposition 209 
supporters drilled home the message that granting preferential treat-
ment for one person meant discriminating against someone else.199 
Such zero-sum equations clearly presuppose a competitive context. 
Furthermore, this limiting construction accords with that placed 
on similar anti-preference language elsewhere in the California Con-
stitution. California courts have construed a ban on preferences to re-
ligion contained in article I, section 4 as only applying in the context of 
a scarce resource.
2OO A key example given by the California Supreme 
Court in Fox v. City of Los AngeieiOI contrasted a religious symbol 
displayed on the roof of city hall with the presence of religious books in 
a library. The former involved a scarce resource (space on the roof), 
and thus violated Article one, section 4.202 By contrast, even though a 
library may not stock books on each and every religion, the court indi-
cated that those religions favored by representation were nonetheless 
not illegally preferred since "[1]ibrarians quite easily can offset a po-
tenti~ for preference" by adding additional books to the shelves in the 
future.203 This scarcity rationale in section 4 dovetails nicely with the 
arguments for restricting preferential treatment in section 31 to zero-
sum contexts, as in both cases the limiting factor is a scarce resource. 
D. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT MUST BE INTENTIONAL 
A further point of uncertainty as to the scope of section 31(a)'s 
prohibition concerns the degree to which the preferential treatment 
contemplated need be intentional. In the case of the affirmative action 
preferences, the advantage conferred was both deliberate and manifest 
198. See id. 
199. See Ward Connerly, An Ugly Campaign to Preserve Quotas, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
25, 1996, at A22 ("A preference for some is an injustice for others."). Id.; Linda See-
bach, California Focus: The Subterfuges Behind the Anti-CCRI Effort, ORANGE 
COUNTY REG., Apr. 3, 1996, at B06 ("preferences for one group equal discrimination 
against anyone not in it. ... "). Id. The Ballot Argument also echoed such sentiments 
with its slogan, "[T]wo wrongs don't make a right" under a heading of "reverse dis-
crimination." See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Argument in Favor. 
200. Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663, 665-66 (Cal. 1978). 
201. Fox, 587 P.2d at 663. 
202. See id. at 665-66. 
203. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 21 Whittier L. Rev. 38 1999-2000
38 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21 
on their face. While one need not restrict section 31 solely to facial 
preferences, a preferential treatment standard does appear to contain an 
implied intent requirement.204 
In part, this conclusion derives from the plain meaning of the 
words. First, the word "treatment" focuses on something being done, 
rather than its end result.205 The distinction between treatment and ef-
fect generally turns on one's intent.206 For example, in Title VII, dispa-
rate treatment is distinguished from disparate impact by the presence of 
a discriminatory intent.207 Second, this sense of deliberate action con-
veyed by treatment is arguably reinforced by the use of the verb "grant" 
in the phrase "to grant preferential treatment.,,208 
Furthermore, support for an intent requirement can be gleaned 
from the ballot argument, in that a contrary view, linking preferential 
204. Gotanda et al., suggest that preferential treatment might inhere in effects alone. 
See Gotanda, supra note 11, at,30. They raise this possibility by analogy to Title VII's 
disparate impact theory. However, they offer no persuasive reason why such an inter-
pretation should be adopted, nor do they take into consideration the drastic implications 
entailed in transplanting impact theory from a narrowly defined employment context to 
a much broader constitutional sphere. Cf Washington v. Davis, 426 u.s. 229 (1976) 
(declining to construe equal protection to reach impacts because this would place an 
unacceptable burden on the courts and interfere with legislative prerogative). These 
arguments become multiplied a thousandfold with respect to a preference ban which, 
by hypothesis, is absolute and unmitigated by any scope for exceptions. 
205. For example, a doctor might administer a certain treatment, but whether it 
achieves the desired outcome is a separate question. 
206. Davis, 426 u.s. 241. Thus far this article has discussed discrimination and pref-
erential treatment in terms of facial classifications, which represent the dominant meth-
odology in equal protection analysis. However, even a facially neutral statute may 
nonetheless discriminate (i.e. deny equal protection) if it has discriminatory intent and 
effect. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 275 (1979). One 
would construe preferential treatment, by analogy, to extend to facially neutral statutes 
that deliberately engender preferential outcomes. Similarly, in Title VII, which deals 
primarily with actions where no stated rules apply, intent provides the touchstone of a 
violation. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-02 (1973) 
(discussing the requirements for intentional racial discrimination in the employment 
context). 
207. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 241. Discrimination law (both in Title VII and equal 
protection) generally requires a strict standard of intent. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 
U.S. at 800-02. By analogy to that standard, preferential intent would mean that the 
state actor chooses a specific policy because it will prefer some racial or other status-
defined group, not merely in spite of that probable effect. Cf Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. 
208. To say I grant preferential treatment suggests more deliberateness than if I 
merely act in a way that prefers. Similarly, the connotation of favoritism supplied by 
the ballot argument suggests the influence of some bias in decision-making, which 
differentiates preferential treatment from impartial conduct that merely results in pref-
erential effects. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, and accompanying text. 
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treatment to outcomes alone, would defeat the expressed intention of 
Proposition 209's proponents. Their pro-209 ballot argument empha-
sized that "[t]he state must remain free to help the economically disad-
vantaged.,,209 Given the economically skewed nature of current racial 
demographics, giving aid to the poor cannot help but yield disparate 
2!0 . benefits according to race. If such skewed outcomes were outlawed 
as preferential treatment under section 31, the state would be forbidden 
to do that which CCRI's supporters advertised to voters that it must?!! 
E. REMEDIAL MEASURES TO RESTORE EQUALITY CANNOT BE PREF-
ERENTIAL 
In part, the scenarios addressed in this subsection embody nothing 
more than the common sense notion that section 31(a)'s preference ban 
should not prevent that which its antidiscrimination clause requires. To 
hold otherwise would place the two provisions of section 31 in conflict. 
Under established equal protection doctrine, remedies of proven dis-
crimination have always occupied a special status to which the normal 
prohibitions on race-conscious measures do not apply.212 Therefore, 
209. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Rebuttal to Argument Against. 
210. Id. 
211. An objection could also be made that without an intent requirement, a ban on 
preferential effects would be overbroad and unworkable in practice. See Ballot Pam-
phlet, supra note 104. Almost all race conscious policies will, by their very nature, 
generate some inequality in outcome that reflects the differing positions occupied by 
various racial groups in society. For example, consider the United States census, a 
seemingly innocuous exercise of race conscious classification that no one would nor-
mally consider as granting preferential treatment. Yet, if one looks to effects, di'sparities 
nonetheless emerge. Indeed, the heated controversy over the Census Bureau's proposed 
shift to a statistical sampling method that would arguably augment the count of certain 
minority groups underscores the political ramifications at stake. See generally Census 
Sensibility, THE ECONOMIST, July 25, 1998, at 31. Without some method of discrimi-
nating between types of effects, imposing a prohibition on any race conscious measure 
that yields discernible disparities in impact would, for all intents and purposes, amount 
to a ban on race consciousness per se-something this article has already argued that 
the term, by its plain meaning and context, does not do. See supra notes 190-93 and 
accompanying text. 
212. Cf North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971) (stating 
that where a "constitutional violation has occurred ... race must be considered in for-
mulating a remedy"); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 190 (1987) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (strict scrutiny does not apply to equitable remedies). 
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one would not expect such remedies of discrimination to be affected 
under CCRI's new preferential treatment standard.213 
The more difficult question is the extent to which this under-
standing of remedy as non-preferential extends to affirmative measures 
voluntarily undertaken to restore equality. There is some support for 
this proposition in equal protection law, at least where such remedies 
are limited to non-zero-sum scenarios.214 Moreover, cases examining 
the relationship be,tween preference and discrimination in the context of 
religion under article I, section 4 of the California Constitution also 
suggest that the notion of remedy as non-preferential extends to pro-
phylactic measures.215 
VII. DOES BUSING GRANT PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT? 
Having read the preferential treatment ban of clause (a) to rule out 
certain "suspect" racial classifications which facially or intentionally 
confer advantage, it remains now to determine the extent to which 
busing falls within this definition. This article argues that it does not 
apply for has two reasons. First, the availability of busing as a remedial 
option in fact may be required under existing California equal protec-
tion precedents. If so, it is doubtful that section 31 alters this constitu-
tional requirement. Second, even if busing were not strictly required 
under these precedents, it still does not fall into the "loophole" in equal 
protection law that Proposition 209 was designed to close. 
The second argument has two components. First, voluntary deseg-
regation plans such as busing may not give rise to a "suspect" classifi-
cation in a legal sense. As such, voluntary desegregation may not be 
213. Cf City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 524 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (approving of race-conscious remedies for constitutional violation even while 
rejecting racial preferences). 
214. See Wilson v. State Personnel Bd., No.96CS01082, (Cal. Supp. Ct., Dept. 33, 
Nov. 30, 1998) (arguing that "equal protection guarantees may not be implicated by, 
and strict scrutiny review may not apply to, affirmative government actions which seek 
to expand employment and other economic opportunities for minorities and women 
without disadvantaging or burdening persons of other racial groups or men"); id. at 13-
14 (affirmative action to remedy identified underutilization of minorities in non-zero-
sum fashion.is not preferential). This argument will be explored in further detail in Part 
VI-B 1. See infra notes 236-47 and accompanying text. 
215. See Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist, 809 P.2d 809, 840 n.4 (Cal. 1991) 
(stating that when "the denial of religious expression ... would raise the specter of 
discrimination ... [a contrary course of action] does not constitute an unconstitutional 
preference."); Lucas Valley Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Marin, 284 Cal. Rptr. 
427. 436 (Ct. App. 1991) (zone of preference does not include action "necessary to 
avert discrimination"). 
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subject to strict scrutiny under equal protection doctrine.216 Since strict 
scrutiny provided the loophole in equal protection law that section 31' s 
preference ban is supposed to close, if desegregation does not trigger 
strict scrutiny, it would follow, a fortiori, that such plans fall outside 
that prohibition. Second, even if race-conscious desegregation does 
constitute a suspect classification to which strict scrutiny applies, this 
article argues that the reciprocal student assignments involved in busing 
still do not involve the sort of preferential classification to which 
CCRI's prohibition was addressed. This last portion of the argument 
further divides into two parts. First, busing is distinguished from pref-
erential, zero-sum uses of race because, on its face, it does not confer 
an advantage to any racial group. Second, to the extent that busing has 
preferential effects, these effects are justified. by its remedial purpose. 
A. THE OPTION OF BUSING MAY BE REQUIRED BY THE CAliFORNIA 
CONSTITUTION 
As explained in Part I-B, segregated conditions in public schools 
constitute a violation of equal protection under the California Constitu-
tion. Moreover, district . authorities have an affinnative duty to imple-
ment desegregation plans to alleviate such conditions.217 Reading sec-
tion 31 to forbid voluntary desegregation would hamstring the ability of 
school districts to discharge their constitutional duty under these prece-
dents, denying them a crucial remedial tool that the text of the Califor-
nia equal protection clause explicitly preserves to them218 and which 
216. Under a Title VII model, the equivalent proposition would be that voluntary 
desegregation does not give rise to even a prima facie case of discrimination to which 
the "bona fide affirmative action exception" would be invoked. See supra notes 158, 
171-72 and accompanying text. 
217. See supra notes 46 and accompanying text. 
218. See CAL. CON ST. art. I, § 7, cl. (a) ("[n]othing herein shall prohibit the governing 
board of a school district from voluntarily continuing or commencing a school integra-
tion plan"). As noted, it is not without significance that this provision was itself in-
serted into the California Constitution via initiative. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 
458 U.S. 527, 531 (1982). That initiative was designed to override one portion of the 
California Supreme Court's holding in Crawford, which had permitted mandatory 
court-ordered busing. See id. at 531 n.3. Yet, in doing so, voters did not alter the con-
stitutional duty to remedy de facto segregation, which that case established, and indeed 
they simultaneously approved the language quoted above specifically preserving the 
option of voluntary desegregation. This suggests that the electorate agreed that deseg-
regation should be carried out, and that busing could be a legitimate part of that proc-
ess, so long as the plan in question was drafted by the local school board and not in a 
judge's chambers. Now comes CCRI with its prohibition on preferential treatment, a 
tenn whose outennost limits might impinge on desegregation, but whose wording 
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case law may require.219 Such an interpretation arguably would amount 
to an implied repeal of this aspect of California equal protection law.220 
Repeals by implication are strongly disfavored in California law.221 
Furthermore, ccru proponents promised voters in the ballot argument 
that Proposition 209 "does NOTHING to any existing constitutional 
provisions."m Such an implied -repeal would seem to violate that 
pledge. 
Nothing in CCRI's legislative history suggests an intentional re-
peal of existing state equal protection law. Voluntary desegregation 
was conspicuously absent from the list of programs discussed in the 
Ballot Pamphlet Arguments. Although the Legislative Analyst did ad-
dress voluntary desegregation, her analysis focused on magnet schools 
and funding for "racially isolated" schools, two specific types of deseg-
regation programs, which differ from the paradigmatic case of busing, 
pertains to much more obvious targets. Moreover, this new initiative arrived amidst a 
debate in which desegregation appeared nowhere on the radar screens. Under these 
circumstances, one would not expect this newer, but far more general provision to 
override the earlier consensus voiced by the California electorate on that one specific 
issue. 
219. Race-neutral methods of achieving voluntary integration would, of course, re-
main a permissible option. However, the California Courts have already indicated that 
race-neutral methods may not suffice for a school district to fulfill its affirmative duty 
to desegregate. See San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 479 P.2d 669, 682-83 
(Cal. 1971) (race-based pupil assignments "will often be the only effective device to 
eliminate de facto segregation"). Furthermore, even if the use of busing is not strictly 
required in any particular case, its availability as a remedial option may be constitu-
tionally guaranteed as the cases cited in the following note indicate. 
220. The California Supreme Court has previously struck down legislation designed 
to bar race-based student assignments as inconsistent with state equal protection guar-
antees. See Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 530 P.2d 605, 614 (Cal. 1975) 
(holding CAL. EDUC. CODE § 3535 unconstitutional). [d.; see also Johnson, 479 P.2d at 
681-84 (interpretation of statute to forbid race-based pupil assignments would violate 
state equal protection). Reading section 31 to achieve what these statutes were forbid-
den to do would effectively override the constitutional basis for these holdings. 
221. See, e.g., Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution 
Control Dist., 777 P.2d 157, 163 (Cal. 1989) ("The presumption against implied repeal 
is so strong that, '[t]o overcome the presumption, the two acts must be irreconcilable, 
clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent opera-
tion. "'). [d. 
222. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra 104, at Rebuttal to Argument Against. This assur-
ance came in a section of the Rebuttal that discussed gender discrimination. The pre-
ceding sentence noted that "Proposition 209 adds NEW PROTECTION against sex 
discrimination on top of existing ones, which remain in full force and effect." /d. How-
ever, there is no reason to suspect that section 31 effects a repeal of existing protections 
against racial discrimination any differently than its effect with respect to gender. 
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examined in this article.223 The omission of busing from the Legislative 
Analyst's report arguably suggested to voters that desegregation of that 
sort would not be affected by Proposition 209's passage.224 
Furthermore, while the context of the C(:RI's campaign reveals 
inescapable links between Proposition 209 and the affirmative action 
debate, no similar contextual links to desegregation emerge. Indeed', as 
noted, the suggestion that voluntary desegregation plans might be af-
fected by the initiative's passage seemed to surprise even the CCRI's 
proponents.225 
If one considers the perspective of the hypothetical "reasonable 
voter" discussed in Hill,226 perusing the ballot materials and following 
the campaign debate in order to decide how to vote, one strongly sus-
pects that such a voter-had she troubled to frame the issue-would 
have received the impression that Proposition 209 would affect busing. 
To be sure, section 31, as a constitutional provision, embodies general 
principles as to which the ballot discussion can be taken as only illus-
trative. Yet, the sum of these materials creates the distinct impression 
that, whatever else preferenti;ll treatment might mean, its scope would 
not extend to busing. 
B. BUSING FALLS OUTSIDE OF THE LOOPHOLE THAT CCRI AIMED TO 
CLOSE 
As explained in Part V -A, the ban on preferential treatment that 
section 31 imposes was designed to close a loophole in antidiscrimina-
tion law. Before the enactment of CCRI, certain preferential classifica-
tions-paradigmatically those identified with affirmative action case 
law-had evaded the constitutional prohibitions on such "suspect" uses 
of race via the narrow window afforded by strict scrutiny.227 Section 
31 's preference bar, therefore, can be understood as now precluding 
such preferential uses of race without exception. The question to be 
addressed here is whether busing falls into the category of "suspect" 
classifications, which this new standard targets. 
223. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Analysis by Legislative Analyst. 
224. See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text. 
225. See Asimov, supra note 125; cf Jan Ferris, Public Schools Concerned About 
Prop. 209's Reach: Some Fear that Elementary and Secondary Programs May be at 
Risk, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Nov. 28, 1996, at A4 ("Public elementary and high 
schools weren't the intended targets of Proposition 209"). Id. 
226. Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994). 
227. As noted, Title VII case law offers an equivalent exception for bona fide af-
firmative action plans. See supra notes 158, 171-74 and accompanying text. 
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1. Busing May Not Constitute a Suspect Classification 
The first question to ask is whether voluntary desegregation pro-
grams that explicitly use racial criteria in determining district-wide 
pupil assignments constitute a "suspect" classification. In essence, we 
must determine whether these programs would be put to the test of 
strict scrutiny under current equal protection standards. If not, they fall 
outside the loophole in antidiscrimination law that Proposition 209 was 
designed to end. 
Since CCRI amends the California Constitution, the particular 
loophole that section 31 addresses presumably exists within California 
law, specifically California equal protection case law.228 Would busing 
be "suspect" under California's equal protection clause? Recall that the 
language appended to that clause states explicitly that "nothing herein 
shall prohibit the governing board of a school district from voluntarily 
continuing or commencing a school integration plan .... ,,229 This cate-
gorical exclusion strongly suggests that voluntary desegregation is not 
the sort of suspect use of race to which California equal protection 
scrutiny applies. If so, logically it would not constitute preferential 
treatment under section 31 either. 
One might argue that although this specific exclusion overrides 
the normal operation of state equal protection doctrine, nonetheless 
race-conscious desegregation programs are the kind of thing to which 
strict scrutiny generally applies, and thus fall within the purview of 
CCRI. Even without the exclusion, it is far from clear that busing 
would trigger strict scrutiny under California law. Recall that segre-
gated schools themselves constitute a violation of California equal 
protection standards that school districts have an affirmative duty to 
remedy.230 If so, a desegregation plan adopted to remedy that constitu-
tional violation arguably should not itself be deemed suspect under the 
228. This article has already argued that discrimination in section 31(a) similarly 
tracks the equal protection California Constitution standards. See supra notes 5 & 40 
and accompanying text. 
229. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 cl. (a). As will be elaborated below, this language was 
inserted via a previous constitutional initiative that limited the power of state courts to 
order busing. See supra note 218. However, nothing on the face of the disclaimer is 
restricted to that specific amendment. Constitutional provisions are to be read as a 
seamless whole. According to its ordinary and usual meaning, "nothing herein" thus 
encompasses the entire section. 
230. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 551 P.2d 28, 43-44 (Cal. 1976). 
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, I 
same standard.231 One might question whether such remedial measures 
even represent classifications on the basis of race.232 
Furthermore, even without this special remedial duty imposed 'by 
California case law, it remains an open question whether voluntary 
desegregation would be subject to strict scrutiny under federal equal 
protection standards, to which California law otherwise generally con-
forms. 233 As noted previously, in Swann the Supreme Court stated that 
race-conscious school assignments designed to promote integration lie 
"within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities.,,234 One 
might argue that the Swann Court merely was signaling that publ,ic 
school integration represented a compelling purpose that would there-
fore survive strict scrutiny. Yet, in the same passage, the Court indi-
cated that a school board was free to pursue this purpose by means of 
rigid quotas aimed at proportionate representation-a practice seem-
ingly incompatible with strict scrutiny.235 
Swann was decided in 1971, roughly a decade before the Court 
took up its principal affirmative action cases. At this stage, it remained 
an open question whether race-conscious policies undertaken for "be-
nign" motives such as desegregation would be subject to the same strict 
231. Cf McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1971) (school district's affirmative 
duty to disestablish segregated schools permits voluntary use of race-conscious meas-
ures). 
232. Cf City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 526 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (remedies to identified victims of past discrimination involve classifications on 
the basis of a violation, and thus do not involve classifications by race). Although Jus-
tice Scalia focused on individual victims of discrimination, his rationale could apply 
equally to a class action where plaintiffs of a given racial group assert discrimination in 
an identified context. In California, minority students in segregated schools constitute 
just such a class. Cf id. at 524-25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (failure of school district to 
fulfill its affirmative duty to desegregate represents a continuing equal protection vio-
lation). 
233. See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 n.ll (Cal. 1971) (noting that Califor-
nia's equal protection standards are "substantially the equivalent" of their federal ana-
logue). 
234. McDaniel, 402 U.S. at 16. Because the facts at issue in Swann involved court-
ordered busing, this portion of the opinion represented dicta. See id. at 6-7. Yet, comiiig 
from a unanimous Court, it remains highly persuasive. 
235. Compare id. at 16 ("[I]n order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society, 
.. [school authorities may] prescribe ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the 
proportion for the district as a whole"), with Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (rigid numerical 
quota fails narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny; goal of racial balancing 
impermissible) .. 
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scrutiny as other racial classifications?36 One might therefore think 
Swann can be explained as a benign motive case to which the Court had 
prematurely presumed the applicability of a more lenient standard. Yet, 
in the first opinion to reject that premise, applying strict scrutiny to 
affirmative action, and holding motive irrelevant to the standard of re-
view, Justice Powell, writing in Bakke, maintained that school desegre-
gation differed from affirmative action for reasons that had nothing to 
d . h . 237 o Wlt motive. 
Justice Powell sought to distinguish a pair of lower court opinions 
that had upheld voluntary school desegreg'ation without applying strict 
scrutiny. Rather than rejecting their holdings as erroneous, Justice 
Powell argued the rationale of the lower courts did not apply in zero-
sum contexts such as affirmative action where racial criteria were ap-
plied to favor one applicant at another's expense. 
Respondent's position is wholly dissimilar to that of a pupil bused 
from his neighborhood school to a comparable school in another neigh-
borhood .... Petitioner did not arrange for respondent to' attend a dif-
ferent medical school in order to desegregate Davis Medical School; 
instead, it denied him admission and may have deprived him altogether 
of a medical education.238 
Justice Powell thus distinguished what he called "preferential 
classifications" from the use of race in a non-zero-sum context such as 
school desegregation.239 In doing so, Powell implied that only prefer-
ential classifications-such as those used in affirmative action--de-
236. This asymmetry in the standard of review was deemed justified under the ration-
ale of Justice Stone's famous footnote in Carolene Products, which provided the origi-
nal intellectual underpinnings for strict scrutiny itself. See United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Since heightened scrutiny was designed to 
protect discrete and insular minorities from majoritarian abuses, the logic went, meas-
ures aimed at helping such minorities need not be regarded as presumptively suspect 
and thus merited a less stringent standard of review. However, a decade later, the Court 
explicitly rejected this rationale in its affirmative action cases, holding the applicability 
of strict scrutiny to be determined by the type of classification, not the identity of the 
specific groups being classified. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
226-28 (1995); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. 
237. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298-306 (1978) (Powell. 
J., opinion). Although Justice Powell wrote for himself, his was the deciding vote 
among an evenly divided Court. As such his opinion remains widely accepted as the 
law of the land. See Robert Post Introduction: After Bakke, in RACE AND REPRE-
SENTATIONS/AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 2 (Summer 1996). 
238. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 300 n.39. 
239. Id. at 300-02. 
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manded strict scrutiny.240 Desegregation, being non-preferential, would 
thus be reviewed under a less stringent standard.241 
Justice Powell's distinction went unnoticed in later affirmative 
action cases that continued to push (at least rhetorically) towards estab-
lishing strict scrutiny as the standard applicable to all racial classifica-
tions.242 As noted, volun,tary school desegregation never came before 
the Court, so the specific issue never arose. 243 Yet, as strict scrutiny 
became entrenched as the dominant methodology for reviewing af-
firmative action cases, its influence inevitably bled into the desegrega-
tion decisions reached in the lower courts. Where earlier courts had 
applied more lenient standards of review to voluntary desegregation 
programs,244 most decisions in recent years have gravitated towards 
strict scrutiny as the ap~licable standard.245 Such decisions, however, 
are few and far between. 46 Courts have declined to apply strict scrutiny 
240. See id. at 300-05. The California Supreme Court in its decision below had made 
a similar "distinction between a classification which grants a benefit to one race at the 
expense of another and one which does not have that effect," with only the former 
requiring strict scrutiny. See Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of California, 553 P.2d 1152, 
1168 n.25 (Cal. 1976). 
241. Cf Bolin v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 202 Cal. Rptr. 416 (Cal. 
App. 1984) (relying on the same zero-sumlnon-zero-sum distinction suggested by Pow-
ell in declining to apply strict scrutiny to a faculty integration plan). 
242. See,.e.g., Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-28 (1995); 
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. 
243. Powell continued to recognize that school desegregation cases "differ signifi-
cantly from the Court's subsequent affirmative-action decisions" in equal protection 
terms. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 186, 188 n.2 (1987) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). In a dissenting opinion in a totally different context, Powell suggested that deseg-
regation should be subject to strict scrutiny. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 
458 U.S. 457, 491 n.6 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
244. See Olson v. Board of Educ., 250 F. Supp. 1000, 1009 n.30 (C.D.N.Y. 1966) 
(applying a reasonableness standard). 
245. See Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 864 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(applying strict scrutiny to a consent decree); Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High 
Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 717 (2d Cir. 1979) (applying strict scrutiny to voluntary 
desegregation plan); Johnson v. Board of Educ., 604 F.2d 504, 515 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(same); Equal Open Enrollment Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 937 F. Supp. 700, 705-06 
(N.D. Ohio 1996) (same). But see Bolin v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 202 
Cal. Rptr. 416 (Ct. App. 1984) (declining to apply strict scrutiny to a faculty integration 
plan). 
246. Moreover, most of these cases involved special facts in which the burden of the 
particular desegregation plan was not equitably distributed among all races equally. See 
Ho, 147 F.3d at 858 (magnet schools with preferential admission standards favoring 
minorities); Parent Ass'n, 598 F.2d at 710 (enrollment cap on minority children to 
prevent "white flight"); Johnson, 604 F.2d at 508 (same). A close reading of the fourth 
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to race-conscious policies in other cases where the classifications at 
. d·d . I C 247 Issue I not mvo ve zero-sum prelerences. 
The bottom line is that the level of scrutiny applicable to volun-
tary desegregation under federal equal protection remains an open 
question until the United States Supreme Court clarifies this area of 
law. Its recent decisions on voter districting indicate that federal equal 
protection jurisprudence remains in flUX?48 Although in general, the 
outcome of these cases support a broader application of strict scrutiny 
to racial questions,249 they came down as 5-4 decisions. Moreover, the 
facts of the districting cases are distinguishable from voluntary deseg-
regation.25o Therefore, it remains uncertain whether a busing plan 
case, Open Enrollment, reveals a more even-handed policy was in place in that whites 
were prevented from transferring out, while minority transfers were not allowed in. 
However, the court analyzed the case throughout as if the no-transfer policy applied 
only to whites. See 937 F. Supp. at 704, 705-09. None of these cases involved the para-
digmatic, reciprocal intra-district student assignments, which busing plans normally 
establish. 
247. Most recent cases of this kind have involved minority outreach policies. See, 
e.g., NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1571 (lith Cir. 1994) (characterizing race-
specific outreach as "race-neutral" for purposes of equal protection scrutiny); Raso v. 
Lago, 958 F. Supp. 686, 701-03 (D. Mass. 1997), aff'd 135 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(race-specific outreach is not suspect classification); Shuford v. Alabama State Bd. of 
Educ., 897 F. Supp. 1535, 1551-56 (M.D. Ala. 1995) ("inclusive" affirmative action to 
expand the applicant pool does not require strict scrutiny); Domar Elec., Inc. v. City of 
Los Angeles, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 822, 831-33 (Ct. App. 1995) (outreach race neutral). But 
see Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(applying strict scrutiny to outreach); Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 
703 (9th Cir. 1997) (same). See also Harnm v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. 
Supp. 156, 158 (E.D. Va. 1964) (keeping of racial statistics does not present equal 
protection issue). 
248. See generally Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 
900 (1995). 
249. Unlike affirmative action where racial classifications unmistakably disadvan-
taged the nonpreferred class, these voting rights cases addressed the permissibility of 
race conscious government action that did not burden any identifiable group. Indeed, 
the Miller Court explicitly distinguished earlier vote dilution cases where state action 
"disadvantag[ed] voters of a particular race." 515 U.S. at 911. Instead, it stated "the 
essence of the equal protection claim recognized in Shaw is that the State has used race 
as a basis for separating voters in districts." [d. See also Bush, 517 U.S. at 1008-10 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (making this even more explicit). 
250. The voting cases addressed the use of race in districting to separate voters into 
racially-defined blocks. As such, their holdings finding such racial segregation uncon-
stitutional seem distinguishable from the desegregation context in which race is used to 
integrate. The Miller Court, for example, cited a long string of racial segregation cases, 
from Brown onward, as support for the proposition that government-enforced racial 
separation violates equal protection. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 911. In addition, there is 
language in Miller that focuses on the particular dangers of segregation in the context 
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would face strict scrutiny under a federal equal protection analysis. In 
any case, as noted, section 31 would most likely apply a California 
equal protection standard in which special allowances for desegregation 
make strict scrutiny less warranted. 251 
of electoral districting; the opinion bemoaned "demeaning ... stereotypes" and noted 
that "[r]acial gerrymander[s] ... balkanize us." [d. at 912. Yet, the Miller Court also 
put a new spin on the Brown segregation cases, describing equal protection as em-
bodying the "simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, 
not as simply components of a racial ... class." /d. at 911. By this account, racial clas-
sifications become suspect by their very act of making group-based distinctions. In 
doing so, Miller appears to refashion Brown from a sociological proposition about 
American Apartheid to a far more abstract statement of principle against race con-
sciousness per se. Through this logic, the conservative wing of current Court seems 
intent on driving equal protection to advance its vision of color-blind absolutism. In 
any case, as noted, the votes on these cases were close, and the underlying equal pro-
tection issues present deep jurisprudential questions that are not necessary to resolve 
here. 
251. This article (and the California courts thus far) have analyzed section 31 in terms 
of equal protection principles. In the event, however, that section 31's prohibition on 
preferential treatment were construed based on a Title VII model, the outcome would 
arguably not change as Title VII discrimination has been read as narrower than that of 
equal protection. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628 (1986). It 
may be worth elaborating briefly why: 
Unlike the equal protection models in which discrimination turns on the application of 
strict scrutiny to suspect classifications, Title VII has statutory language that bans dis-
crimination directly. In particular, Title VII may impose a higher threshold requirement 
than merely identifying a classification. Whereas to classify suggests merely the mak-
ing of distinctions, without any implication of inequality, the use of discrimination in 
Title VII appears to contemplate more than mere distinctions. At least implicitly, its 
wording evokes expectations of unequal treatment. To incur a violation, an employer 
must "discriminate against [an] individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(l)(1996) (emphasis 
added). The inclusion of the preposition "against" suggests action contrary to the re-
cipient'S interests. The language of Title VII thus requires "some meaningful distinc-
tion that either burdens or benefits an [individual's] employment privilege." MACK 
PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 423 (West 1988); cf Norman-Bloodsaw 
v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1998) (reversing a lower 
court that" had dismissed a Title VII claim on the grounds that plaintiffs suffered no 
adverse effects-but in doing so implicitly confirming that adverse effects are a re-
quirement). 
In addition, Title VII case law supports the proposition that differential treat-
ment need not give rise to discrimination. Certain cases have allowed employers to 
make distinctions in treatment based on gender without giving rise to a Title VII claim. 
See generally Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(grooming codes); Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Mo. 
1979) (uniforms). Note these cases did not invoke Title VII's exception for bona fide 
occupational qualifications, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(e)(l); they held that the conduct did 
not amount to even a prima facie violation of Title VII. Although no precisely analo-
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2. Busing Does Not Confer an Advantage to Any Group 
Even if busing were subject to strict scrutiny, this would not mean 
. it was preferential. On some readings of equal protection doctrine, all 
race-conscious government action is "suspect" in this way. This article, 
however, has already argued that section 31 (a)' s prohibition does not 
preclude racial classifications unless they are "preferential." In essence, 
this means determining whether busing confers an identifiable race-
based advantage, either facially or intentionally. 
Busing might do this in two ways. First, within a given neighbor-
hood, children from one race might be assigned out to more distant 
schools while those of another race would be permitted to attend 
schools locally. One could argue that avoiding the burden of being 
bused across town represents a preference to those who stay. Second, as 
between neighborhoods, one could argue that busing prefers those local 
schools that are of an inferior quality to those whose schools are of a 
higher caliber. 
a. The Burden of Being Bused 
Addressing only the first objection (and thus assuming for the 
present that all schools are of equal quality), one must determine 
whether avoiding the burden of being bused amounts to preferential 
treatment on the basis of race. On one level, this argument has some 
force. After all, equality is an individual right. 252 It is hardly a consola-
tion that other children of a different race are being bused into your 
neighborhood school, if you have leave to go elsewhere because your 
race is overrepresented.253 Indeed, Justice Powell hinted in Bakke that 
gous cases have been reported involving race, the principles at stake may be general-
ized in other circumstances. Cf Norman, 135 F.3d at 1272 n.20 ("a case involving two 
different but equivalent tests administered to men and women" would not give rise to a 
Title VII claim). [d. If men and women can receive different tests without prompting 
charges of discrimination, what would be the objection if, for example, Jewish employ-
ees were tested for Tay-Sachs disease, while their African-Americans colleagues re-
ceived screening for sickle cell anemia? 
Because the reciprocal student assignments involved in busing provide students 
of each race with different, but equivalent treatment, arguably no Title VII violation 
would lie. Although there are obvious objections to these premises, they will be dealt 
with in the discussion of preferential treatment below. 
252. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (Powell, J., 
opinion). 
253. Cf Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 717 
(2d Cir. 1979) (calling for strict scrutiny where desegregation plan burdens individual 
members of a given race even if it benefits other members of the same group). 
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"extensive pupil transportation ... might threaten liberty or privacy 
interests" of students, thus undermining the logic of fungibility (one 
school as good as the next), which he saw as distinguishing desegrega-
tion from affirmative action.254 
The flaw in this mode of analysis, however, is that it assumes that 
neighborhood schooling represents a preexisting norm. All students 
have the right to a place in school, but there is no right to go a particu-
lar school.255 Students who are bused are not "denied admission" by 
local schools because school desegregation plans determine placements 
on a district-wide basis.256 Shifting the analysis from particular schools 
in particular neighborhoods, to the district as a whole, changes the 
bases of comparison. Judged at the district level, busing does, not dis-
advantage anybody on the basis of race because all races-from all 
neighborhoods-suffer an equal burden.257 
A desegregation plan based on such neutral, redistributive princi-
ples thus appears non-preferential on its face. To be sure, certain indi-
viduals may feel relatively disadvantaged by its effects. 258 Yet, to grant 
preferential treatment connotes favoritism. 259 A desegregation plan that 
spreads its burden equally on all races hardly exhibits ,favoritism.260 
254. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 301 n.39. 
255. See Johnson v. Board of Educ., 604 F.2d 504, 515 (7th Cir. 1979). 
256. As n0ted, the situations presented by Parent Ass 'n and Johnson may be distin-
guishable in this respect, because these cases dealt with restrictions solely on minority 
students' attendance at particular schools so as to prevent "white flight." See Parent 
Ass'n, 598 F.2d at 718-20; Johnson, 604 F.2d at 507-09. 
257. To illustrate why this is so, consider the following hypothetical: In theory, a 
school district could assign all of its students to be bused to schools elsewhere in the 
district. Assume that it did so according to some random algorithm. Now consider the 
case in which these random assignments were adjusted to balance out the racial distri-
butions. Who would be disadvantaged under these circumstances? 
Yet, if such a system were not preferential, why should it be preferential treat-
ment to implement a modified system that allowed some portion of the student body at 
each school to be drawn from the immediate neighborhood so as to minimize the in-
convenience of busing while still respecting the primary goal of racial balancing? 
Surely, it would be perverse to condemn this modified system under section 31 when 
students of all races benefit by reduced school commutes. 
258. One might question, however, whether the relative disadvantage on these stu-
dents is allocated on the basis of race, as section 31' s terms require, as opposed to 
advantage/disadvantage on the basis of geography and demographics. 
259. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
260. Although the dislocation caused by a busing plan may cause some inconven-
ience to individual students, such plans are carried out in spite of, and not because of, 
these adverse effects. Cf Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 
(1979). 
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Accordingly, although individual students may feel disadvantaged by 
busing, one cannot say that the effects of the plan as a whole represent 
preferential treatment.261 
This conclusion may hold even if one focuses on an individual 
neighborhood in which local assignments represent a baseline norm. 
Bused students may bear a commuting burden not shared by their 
neighbors; yet, one would not normally speak of the district as having 
"granted preferential treatment" to those who remain enrolled in neigh-
borhood schools for two reasons. First, the students who stay local are 
no better off than they would have been in the absence of a desegrega-
tion plan. From their standpoint, although their classmates suffer a bur-
den, they are not preferred. Second, the fact that school assignments do 
not occur in a competitive setting makes any ready assessment of its 
impact problematic.262 No one applies for admission to a particular 
school; they are assigned places by administrative fiat. Who is to say 
that it is not the bused students who are preferred? Although the dislo-
cation and additional travel entailed may be unwelcome to some, they 
might reap benefits from studying in a more diverse setting. Because 
nobody is actually competing for placements, keeping score as to win-
ners and losers thus remains contingent upon extrinsic value 
judgments.263 
For all of these reasons, it would take a stretch of language to say 
that the burden of being bused alone constitutes preferential treatment. 
At this juncture, it may help to revisit the distinction made by Justice 
Powell in Bakke between the race-conscious assignments made in de-
segregation plans and the far more problematic zero-sum use of race in 
affirmative action. In his terminology, "preferential classifications" 
referred only to the latter. Justice Powell's choice of words is hardly 
idiosyncratic.264 Affirmative action has become synonymous with pref-
26l. Note that a different question is presented if the burdens of desegregation fall 
disproportionately on a single race. Cf Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 861 F.2d 
591, 596 (9th Cir. 1988) (considering such a claim); Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 
F.2d 779, 794 (6th Cir. 1974) (same). 
262. As noted earlier, there is reason, in any case, semantically to construe preferen-
tial treatment as being limited to competitive settings. See supra note 158 and accom-
panying text. 
263. By contrast, if preferential treatment were to apply only to competitive settings 
as suggested above, then the need to engage in such speculation would be unnecessary; 
preferential effects could be assessed by reference to the common objective(s) being 
contested. 
264. Indeed, as noted above, the plain meaning of preference in and of itself suggests 
a zero-sum context such as affirmative action. 
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erential treatment in case law and in practice.265 Yet, voluntary deseg-
regation is rarely thought of as preferentia1.266 
Such semantic contrasts rest on genuine substantive differences. A 
comparison of the racial balancing involved in school desegregation 
versus university admissions, for example, shows why only the latter 
should be properly deemed preferential treatment. Whereas everybody 
has the right to a lower school education and school assignments oper-
ate on a district-wide level, university admissions are selective, and 
each university makes its own decisions independently. As a result, in 
the lower school context, an "underrepresented" race at one school will, 
by definition, be "overrepresented" somewhere else, and de segregative 
busing merely trades students from one school to another. By contrast, 
affIrmative action for the benefit of underrepresented races in univer-
sity admissions offer no such guarantee of offsetting reciprocities else-
where. Instead, racial balancing in a university context entails allocat-
ing a greater share of admission slots to one race at the expense of other 
nonpreferred races, leaving otherwise qualified candidates out in the 
cold.267 
Moreover, as noted, neighborhood schooling is purely a matter of 
administrative tradition and convenience. A policy decision to reassign 
students to other schools for desegregation purposes thus violates no a 
priori norms. By contrast, university admissions are supposed to oper-
ate on merit. For example, the University of California, by law, re-
serves slots for the top 12.~% of California high school graduates. 
Granting admissions preferences to certain students derogates from this 
preexisting principle of meritocracy. For all of these reasons, a "zero 
sum" context such as university admissions seems intrinsically prefer-
ential where busing does not. 
As noted, the legislative history of CCRI supports this intuitive 
understanding of preference as pertaining to a zero-sum context. The 
265. Affirmative action plans make no secret of their preferential nature and openly 
use the term "preference" to describe their policies. See, e.g., Minority/Women/Local 
Business Utilization Ordinance, San Francisco Administrative Code, Chapter 12D 
(Ord. 175-89) (describing a bidding preference conferred to women and minority con-
tractors as part of the city's affirmative action program for public contracting); CAL. 
EDUC. CODE REGS, tit. 5, § 53006(c) (preference in state community college hiring). 
266. The desegregation cases cite above refer to the student assignment policies at 
issue as being racial classifications, but never as "preferences" or "preferential." 
267. In terms of the religion cases paradigm, this makes universities like the roof of 
city hall (i.e. a scarce resource), while desegregation resembles a library collection 
(with potential for equalizing offsets). 
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pro-209 campaign was waged primarily as a referendum on affirmative 
action.268 The examples given in the Argument in Favor, of preferential 
evils that CCRI was designed to proscribe were drawn exclusively from 
zero sum contexts.269 And throughout the campaign, Proposition 209's 
supporters emphasized that granting preferential treatment to one per-
son means discriminating against someone else.27o Desegregation sim-
ply does not fit within this model because, at the end of the day, every 
student still gets a place in school, which is all they were entitled to 
going in. 
b. Disparities in School Quality 
A second potential objection remains to be addressed. So far, the 
analysis has assumed that all schools are equal in quality and, thus, 
school placements are fungible. Yet, unfortunately, public schools may 
not all be equal. Schools in affluent, predominantly white neighbor-
hoods may be more desirable than those in poorer minority areas for 
any number of reasons.271 Assuming that school quality does correlate 
to some extent with race and income, then busing would disproportion-
ately favor those students whose racial groups predominate in poorer 
neighborhoods. 
Even so, this does not necessarily constitute preferential treat-
ment. Desegregation plans operate solely with respect to racial distri- . 
butions, and, on their face, take no account of school quality.272 Thus, 
268. Or rather, to be precise, against the preferential incarnation into which affirma-
tive action had devolved. 
269. The Ballot Argument in Favor states that Government "must not give a job, a 
.university admission, or a contract based on race or sex." See Ballot Pamphlet, supra 
note 104, at Argument in Favor. It says nothing about lower school placements. 
270. See supra note 117. 
271. See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 56-58 
(1973) (discussing correlation between financial and racial demographics and educa-
tional quality). For the sake of simplicity, much of the following discussion will be 
framed in terms of the dominant majority/minority paradigm traditionally associated 
with desegregation. To be sure, California's increasingly diverse communities-and 
especially its multi-ethnic public school populations-make such generalizations sus-
pect. Moreover, the educational achievements of certain Asian ethnic groups have 
turned the notion disadvantaged minorities on its head. See generally Selena Dong, 
"Too Many Asians": The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination Against Asian-
Americans and Preserving Affirmative Action, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1995). How-
ever, these realities only further obscure the preferential effects of desegregation and 
correspondingly enhance its benign diversity-value. 
272. Presumably, the correlation between school quality and race would be statistical 
and, as such, identifiable mainly in the aggregate. It strains credulity (and enters the 
realm of bigotry) to assume that every predominantly white school, for example, is 
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any such disparity in outcomes might be described as a preferential 
effect. One, however, should not readily equate preferential effects with 
preferential treatment. As noted above, preferential treatment almost 
. I h' . 273 certam y as an mtent requIrement. 
Still, an objector may persist, desegregation does not result in 
preferential outcomes by happenstance. Arguably, the whole point of 
such programs is to benefit minority children by getting them out of 
inner city schools. There is certainly room for debate over the intent 
behind desegregation. Authorities differ as to whether the goal is to 
benefit minorities in particular or merely to ensure that students of all 
races profit from a diverse learning experience?74 Doubtless each view 
has some basis in fact-intent is rarely an unidimensional 
phenomenon.275 
Even if one accepts the premise that desegregation is designed to 
favor minorities, one would still hesitate to call such programs to pref-
erential treatment, 276 when all they seek to do is ensure that minority 
superior to every school in which minority students predominate. In fact, if student 
quality provides any indicator, the educational achievement of certain minority groups 
in California exceeds that of whites. Cf Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist, 965 F. 
Supp. 1316, 1318 n.2 (N.D. Ca. 1997) (showing Chinese-American 'students outper-
form other ethnic groups on standardized tests). As such, one cannot elide treatment 
with effects by arguing that the two are intrinsically and unalterably linked. 
273. See supra notes 204-11 and accompanying text. 
274. 'Compare Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 472 (1982) 
("[D]esegregation ... inures primarily to the benefit of the minority and is designed for 
that purpose.") with id. at 495 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[Clhildren of all races benefit 
from exposure to 'ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom.'). [d. at 497 n.l2 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting) ("It is far from clear that ... mandatory busing necessarily benefits 
racial minorities or that it is even viewed with favor by racial minorities."). [d. 
275. Furthermore, the legal methodologies for divining intent leave much to be de-
'sired. From here, one could proceed to squabble over the extent to which ulterior mo-
tives should control over ostensible purpose. One could also dispute whether the newer 
Miller standard requiring that race be the "predominant factor" in the design of voter 
districts should apply to school assignments as well, in lieu of the established Arlington 
Heights "motivating factor" test. Compare Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 271 & n.21 (1977) with Miller v. Johnson, 515 
U.S. 900, 917 (1995). 
276. And here one would need to be precise about exactly how it favors them. Most 
accounts suggest that the "benefit" conferred inheres in the removal of segregated 
school conditions, as opposed to any change in the caliber of instruction offered. Cf 
Jackson v. Pasadena City Sch. Dist., 382 P.2d 878, 880-81 (Ct. App. 1963) ("The seg-
regation of school children into separate schools because of their race, even though the 
physical facilities and the methods and quality of instruction . .. may be equal, deprives 
the children of the minority group of equal opportunities for education .... ") (empha-
sis added). [d. The fact that certain minority students bused to the suburbs may receive 
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children have access to the same opportunities as everyone else. To 
condemn busing as preferential treatment would assume that white 
children have some preexisting right to the "good" schools, when their 
claim is based, at best, on some arbitrary confluence of geography, 
economics, and racial demographics.277 Again, nobody has a right to go 
to a particular school in a district funded by all. Desegregation may 
even out the distribution of races attending schools in the district, but it 
certainly does not give minority students a disproportionate share of the 
places at any given school.278 A policy of ensuring that students of all 
races enjoy equal educational opportunities seems the very antithesis of 
. "'1 279 grantmg prelerentla treatment. 
This common sense conclusion is backed by a wealth of legal 
precedent. The California Supreme Court has held that education is a 
fundamental right ensured by the California Constitution?80 Inequality 
of funding between school districts constitutes an abridgment of that 
right.281 Presumably, inequalities in the caliber of education provided 
by individual schools within a district would do so also. Moreover, 
segregated conditions themselves violate equal protection, and district 
authorities have an affirmative duty to implement programs to alleviate 
such conditions.282 \ 
a bonus in the form of attending better quality schools would therefore, on this account, 
be an unintended preferential effect. 
277. The argument is sometimes made that by choosing to live in wealthier school 
districts, parents "pay" for better schools through higher property taxes (and the better 
schools, in tum, raise property values leading to even higher tax assessments). This 
argument is misplaced in the present context for two reasons. First, busing is an intra-
district remedy. All the schools in a district that employ busing are funded from the 
same revenue pool that is supposed to be allocated evenly. Moreover, even if one ac-
cepted that government services should somehow be allocated on a pro rata basis ac-
cording to contributions paid in, the California Supreme Court has explicitly held that 
such classifications on the basis of wealth violate 'state equal protection guarantees in 
the context of public education. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 950-53 (Cal. 1976) 
(holding a system of school financing based on local tax revenues unconstitutional). 
278. With the possible exception of the (putatively inferior) schools located in neigh-
borhoods in which such minorities already predominated. 
279. Cf San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 479 P.2d 669, 677 (Cal. 1971) 
("[TJhe racial classification involved in the effective integration of public schools, does 
not deny, but secures, the equal protection of the laws"). Note that the Ballot Argument 
in Favor argued that "[tJhe only honest and effective way to address inequality of op-
portunity is by making sure that all California children are provided with the tools to 
compete in our society." See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 104, at Argument in Favor. 
What better way to do this than by ensuring equal access to quality schools? 
280. See Serrano, 557 P.2d at 951. 
281. See id. 
282. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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Even if busing is not strictly mandated as a remedy, the fact re-
mains that it does serve a remedial function by removing conditions 
that deny equal treatment in public schools. As suggested above in Part 
V -E, such efforts to prevent discrimination arguably lie outside the 
. f c'al 283 Ad' h . meanmg 0 prelerenti treatment. optmg suc a constructIOn 
would insulate the two prongs of section 31 from internal conflict and 
would be in accord with the California Supreme Court's approach has 
taken with respect to religion in cases under Article I, section 4?84 
One might object that allowing race-conscious measures in the 
guise of remedies to escape section 31' s prohibitions would open the 
door to the very affirmative action preferences that Proposition 209 
sought to eliminate. While it is true that much of affirmative action is 
justified in remedial terms/85 there are important differences. Volun-
tary desegregation has a remedial footing based on actual, identified 
discrimination, which affirmative action preferences lack. 286 Although 
university admissions criteria are sometimes attacked as "discriminat-
ing" against certain minority groups, California courts have never 
found that racial imbalances in higher education to constitute an equal 
protection violation. . 
This jurisprudential distinction reflects important differences be-
tween the two contexts. Whereas access to lower education represents a 
fundamental right in California, university applicants have no right to 
higher education, and spaces are limited. Applicants qualify for admis-
283. Cf Wilson v. State Personnel Bd., No. 96CS01082, (Cal. Supp. Ct., Dept. 33, 
Nov. 30, 1998) (holding that affirmative action to remedy identified underutilization of 
minorities in non-zero-sum fashion is not preferential under section 31). 
284. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
285. University admissions preferences have traditionally relied on the diversity 
rationale enunciated in Bakke, without any remedial premise. See generally Post, supra 
note 237, at 48. However, in areas such as contracting and employment, the United 
States Supreme Court has indicated that preferences can only be justified as a remedy 
for past discrimination. See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 498-99 (1989). 
286. To justify affirmative action preferences as remedial merely requires a prima 
facie showing of discrimination based on statistical presumptions. See id. at 499-509. 
By contrast, the California Supreme Court has held that segregated school conditions 
constitute an actual violation of state equal protection principles which school districts 
have an affirmative duty to alleviate. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 551 P.2d 28, 43-
44 (Cal. 1976) (en banc); Cf Croson, 488 U.S. at 524-25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (ap-
proving of race-conscious desegregation measures adopted voluntarily to fulfill a 
school district's "affirmative duty to disestablish the dual school systems even while 
rejecting affirmative action preferences under his reading of federal equal protection 
standards."). [d. 
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sion to specific institutions on the basis of objective criteria287 and, 
thus, to this extent have an a priori entitlement to their places, which 
affirmative action policies jeopardize. The consequences for non-
preferred students are not just a relative disadvantage; they are totally 
excluded from participation. Because of such considerations, the con-
stitutional footing of remedial action is fundamentally different in zero-
sum contexts.288 The allowance for proactive remedies is correspond- . 
ingly dirninished.289 
Furthermore, while the remedial justification for affirmative ac-
tion is typically weaker than for desegregation, the preferential nature 
of the former is all the more manifest. While desegregation mayor may 
not engender preferential outcomes, affirmative action unabashedly 
confers preferential treatment that is explicit on the face of the policies 
being applied. Facial preferences-as opposed to indirect effects-fall 
within the unambiguous plain meaning of section 31, and are pro-
scribed accordingly. There should be no doubt, therefore, that the two 
cases are distinguishable; excluding desegregation from the scope of 
section 31 in no way legitimizes preferential affirmative action. 
287. To be sure, the validity of such objective criteria-"merit"-has come under 
considerable attack in recent years. See Yxta Maya Murray, Merit-Teaching, 23 
HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 1073 (1996) (citing many such critiques). Yet, there remains a 
qualitative difference between awarding university admissions on the basis of scholas-
tic achievement and standardized test scores and assigning access to schools based 
solely on the happenstance of one's parents' address. Some may argue that this same 
parents' address-and thus socio-econoriric status--correlates so closely with test 
scores as to make the latter a proxy for the former. However, it takes an exceptionally 
strong critique of merit to insist that the two criteria are indistinguishable. 
288. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385,414,416 (1986) (contrasting university 
admissions with lower school desegregation with respect to remedial requirements); cf 
Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 616 F.2d 1381, 1388 
(9th Cir. 1980) (no duty to engage in remedial action in "stacked deck" (zero sum) 
c,ontexts ). 
289. Cf Wilson v. State Personnel Bd., No.96CS01082, (Cal. Supp. Ct., Dept. 33, 
Nov. 30, 1998) (describing proactive measures to restore equality as constitutionally 
permissible only in non-zero-sum contexts). The Wilson court later appeared to under-
cut its own distinction by arguing that governments have a duty to use preferential (i.e. 
zero-sum) remedies proactively given a statistical indication of discrimination. See id. 
at 18 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 
1987». However, the authority for this proposition appears highly tenuous. It derives 
from a concurring opinion in a United States Supreme Court case. See Wygant v. Jack-
son Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284-95 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). That case 
considered whether government may use preferential remedies, not whether it must. 
The only language there referring to an actual duty to undertake affirmative remedies is 
taken from a desegregation case (i.e. a non-zero-sum context). See id. at 291 (citing 
McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39,41 (1971). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that desegregative busing programs do not 
violate Proposition 209. That initiative targeted only a narrow range of 
preferential classifications. Busing falls outside the scope of CCRI's 
prohibition for two main reasons. First, provisions of the California 
Constitution and case law specific to voluntary desegregation argue for 
its continued legality. Second, a more general distinction exists be-
tween zero-sum programs such as affirmative action and non-zero-sum 
contexts such as busing. A strong argument exists that Proposition 209 
only proscribes the former. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the arguments set out above rely 
on authorities specific to busing, one should not assume that the inter-
pretation of section 31 offered here is sui generis.29o Instead of carving 
out a narrow exception for voluntary desegregation, one could just as 
easily take the constitutionality of such programs as evidence of overall 
voter intent endorsing a narrow construction of preferential treatment 
across the board. On such an account, voluntary desegregation becomes 
a case study to validate the more general distinction between zero-sum 
and non-zero-sum programs. If so, the analysis presented in this article 
would seem to legitimize many other non-zero-sum programs that have 
similar remedial intent, including minority outreach and recruitment, 
"ethnic" scholarships, and racial gerrymanders to increase minority 
representation in elected office. 
290. "Of its own kind or Class. The only one of its kind." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
1434 (6th ed. 1990). 
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